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ABSTRACT
A Case Study of the Contributions of the Special

Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
November 14, 1979 to June, 1980
(May,

1981)

James Joseph Dowd, B.S.E., Westfield State, M. Ed.,

Westfield State, Ed.

D.

Directed by:

,

University of Massachusetts
Dr.

David Schuman

This dissertation provides an in depth study of the

activities and contributions of the Special Commission on
the Reorganization of Higher Education through the period

from November 14, 1979 to June, 1980.

References have also

been made to events and activities taking place both before
and after the subject period.
The initial activities of the Commission received

particular emphasis in this study, because they set the
stage for later direction.

I

have carefully noted the types

and Quality of leadership which surfaced within the Commission, and their effects upon that body.

The importance of the time element has been stressed

on many occasions in the dissertation.

The commencement of

the Commission's work took place amidst an aura of no apparent

worrv relative to the time span within which to work

vi

,

but the

last chapters of the dissertation
indicate the frantic
haste with which the Commission tried to
complete its work.

Forces which acted upon the Commission, both
internal
and external, have been cited and reviewed.
The interaction
of Commission members with their colleagues
and with people
outside the Commission has been clearly delineated.
The

relationship of the Commission with the Governor and
the
legislature proved to be critical, and the dissertation
provides an accurate appraisal of the depth and sincerity

pertaining to that relationship.
I

have been able to provide the essence of this case

study by means of firsthand observation of Commission

meetings, discussions with Commission members and staff,

review of notes, minutes and recordings of Commission meetings, and a vast amount of reading.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an
in depth

study of the contributions of the Special Commission
on the

Reorganization of Higher Education, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, November 14, 1979 to June, 1900.
The dissertation will examine the creation and sub-

sequent operation of the Commission.

The pace of the

Commission's creation was a slow one, and the reasons for
that slowness will be looked at.

The reasons are important

not only as they pertain to the formation of the Commission,
but also as they can be related to subsequent events.
The actions of the staff and members of the Commission
are worthy of close observation, and an assessment will be

made of those efforts as well.
The dissertation will provide a close look at the workings of the executive and legislative branches of Massachu-

setts government, and show how both branches interact with
a Special Commission.

The dissertation will provide observations of what is

offered in general within public higher education in Massachusetts, and will show how the present systems of governance are

structured within public higher education.

1

2

Educators will be shown in action, and the
author will
take pains to show items which were initiated
by educators
to enhance the work of

the.

Special Commission, and also to

show instances whereby the work of educators created
obstacles for the Special Commission.

The workings of power, the levels of leadership, and
the numbing effects of outside forces on the Commission will

also be recorded in this dissertation.

Finally, the dissertation will effectively record the

machinations, progress, regression and internal struggles
of a Commission charged with the reorganization of Massachu-

setts public higher education in a state which historically

has proved to be almost on the edge of paucity with regard
to the financing of public higher education, and whose

state legislature has numbered among its members several who

have seemed bent on destroying at least a portion of the

current systems of public higher education.
Many topics will be addressed in the dissertation, but
the principal thrust of the dissertation will be a case

study of the Special Commission, and all other topics will
be utilized solely as a means to a better understanding of

the Special Commission's work.
Of the outside forces referred to before,

dissertation will show many of them)

,

(and the

none was more powerful

than the Massachusetts legislature.
The power of appropriative bodies is immense; in the

3

case of the Massachusetts legislature, the power is
awesome.
For example, several years ago a Massachusetts State

Representative (not now

a

current member)

,

was quoted on a

commercial radio station news broadcast around budget time
as follows:

"...and that begins next week when the college

presidents come in, and the Hammer of Thor lands
on them, and squashes some of them like the bugs
that they are." 1

Those are just the sentiments of one

former member.

Those sentiments, colorful as they are, indicate an

attitude common to many in the legislature which reflects

a

disdain for certain agencies, and especially for those connected with educational pursuits.

Sometimes the disdain

gains awesome proportions.
To illustrate the last assertion, the Massachusetts

budget for fiscal year 1980 contained

a

provision (passed

by the House and Senate) that would have affected many

administrators within the Massachusetts State Colleqe
system.

“

Specifically, Section 49 of House 6400 called for

the reduction in salary of any administrative

(non-bargaining

unit) personnel who had an established salary of thirty
to

thousand dollars or more per annum as of July

1,

revert back to the existing salary of July

1977 plus any

1,

19

.

additional benefits which might have accrued from the passage of Chapter 872 of the Acts of 1977.

4

The specific provision 49, found in the
budget's outside language, was disapproved by Governor King,
but
its

barbed implications for the State College system
specifically, and for public higher education in general,
did not

give educators a comfortable feeling.
Part of the reason for the dissatisfaction of the

legislature with public higher education was based on the
action of the Massachusetts State College Board of Trustees

naming former Westfield State College President Dr. Robert
L.

Randolph to a position on the Central Board staff after

he had left his position at Westfield State College.

3

In general, the latter part of 1978 and the early

months of 1979 found public higher education taking a verbal
beating from some members of the legislature.
The following quotes are representative of the legis-

lative feeling toward public higher education during the
time frame referred to above.
"The state colleges have been under fire because

don't think they can define their true mission."

I

4

"Fiscal autonomy is the fly in the ointment, that's
the problem... It gives them the green light to do whatever

they damn well please." 5
"...public higher education has not taken the

initiative to correct

abuses, and until it does, it risks

losing fiscal autonomy." 5
Thus, one can see that the formation of the Special

Commission on Reorganization did not
take place at a time
when the legislature exhibited kind
feelings toward educators and education.
Not all members of the legislature,
however, are
completely vindictive sorts. Fortunately, some
are logical,
sharp-thinking and far-reaching in their thoughts.
It is easily perceived that the influence
of the legis-

lature extends not only to the writing and passage
of legislation, and the acts of appropriation of monies,
but their

real sphere of influence occurs when the legislation
and

appropriations help to create an aura, a philosophy and
mood that extends in beneficial ways to some agencies

,

a

and

causes difficult situations for others.
In recenu years, anyway, it is not difficult to detect
hov;

the legislature felt about the financial suoport of

public higher education.
For instance, in the calendar years 1977-7S, Massachu-

setts was compared with all other states and the District of

Columbia, and ranked as follows:
Rank
6

51
46
47

Category
Tax Revenues
Allocation to Public Higher Education
Appropriations per Student
State Public Higher Education and
Cost Index 7

Figures like those above seem incongruous when viewed
at a time when reorganization of Massachusetts education by
a Special Commission was being considered.

Even though

I

6

have only taken a few selected items to
show, it is clear
that the indicated magnitude of Massachusetts
support of

public higher education is nothing to be
proud of.
It is clear that the legislature holds
awesome power.

And, much of this power is put directly into
the House and

Senate Ways and Means Committees.

But it is also clear that

the trend in Massachusetts has been a gradual but
firm ero-

sion of funding support for public higher education.

Thus,

that power of the legislature had not been used to support

public higher education in a positive way within recent
times
Can the legislature, then, be expected to have a

positive approach in dealing with public higher education in

Massachusetts?
My opinion is that as long as the legislature actively

holds the purse strings of the appropriations made each year
by that body to public higher education, and as long as it

continues to require that an agency cannot make internal
changes in its budget (within certain accounts) without

gaining the permission of either the House or Senate Ways
and Means Committee, the status of public higher education

will always be at a low level.
I

am sure that my opinion is shared by many.

In fact,

many objective newspaper reporters have covered the Massachusetts State House beat for years.

Supposedly, their comments

reflect no bias, but only what they see and perceive.

In a

7

comment pertaining to the attitude and actions of the
House
and Senate in the preparation of the FY 1980 Budget
one
of

those reporters

,

Don Ebbeling, stated "Massachusetts tax-

payers are becoming accustomed to this asinine and childish

behavior of our legislators.

And we are all being injured.

Senator John Olver has described the working conditions
of the legislature as he saw them in June of 1979.

mean place.
bad

,

The atmosphere has been poisoned.

"It's a

Times are

inflation is getting worse, and people are looking for

a scapegoat.

..

9

In early 1980, Mayor Koch of New York City proposed a

reduction of nine million dollars in that city's share of
the cost of the CUNY nine community colleges.

brought fire.

The reaction

"Officials, asserting that the community

colleges were already seriously underfinanced, said that the

proposed budget cut, even if ameliorated by

a

tuition in-

crease, would lead to a serious curtailment of programs,

course offerings and student services." 10
In a report concerning public higher education in

Nebraska, Lyman Glenny felt that the legislature is capable
of coordinating the state higher education institutions in

Nebraska,

11

but in another report says that legislators look

at a higher education costs primarily in terms of students

enrolled.

1?

An ominous warning note sounds when Glenny comments

"Legislatures, accountable only to the electorate, need not

8

and rarely do give reasons for
particular appropriations in
any formal and specific manner.
Thus, in light of past results within
Massachusetts

relative to public higher education support
by the legislature, and cognizant of the attitude

(past and present) of

some legislators towards public higher
education,

I

again

strongly state that the legislative influence on
public
higher education is of such a crushing force that
it is by
far the most potentially devastating force to be
directed

towards public higher education.

Furthermore,

I

will show

in the dissertation that the legislature was truly the
most

stultifying outside force on the Special Commission, and
that the Commission was literally haunted by the spectre of
the legislature through all of the 210 days of its existence.

Finally, it succumbed to the inordinate strength of the

Mouse and Senate.

The record will show, however, that

actions of the Special Commission itself actually benefited
the assault on it by the legislature.

Other outside forces existed, although none possessed
the power of the legislature.

These other forces would also

exert an influence on the Commission's work.

Massachusetts has

a

3

to

1

ratio of private colleqes to

public colleges, and the leaders of the private colleges,
their trustees and their alumni showed immense interest in
the forthcoming reorganization and the formation of the

Special Commission.

9

In addition to the ongoing battle of
competition with

the private colleges, segments of public
higher education

also have an active competition with each other.

Thus,

students within the system, professors, alumni,
current

board members

(and the various public segments themselves--

university, state college and community college systems)
also comprised what could be classified as outside forces
as the Commission prepared for action.

The Board of Higher Education, the Executive Office of

Educational Affairs, and the Board of Education would also
have to be considered as outside forces.

Any study by the

Special Commission would probably evaluate the roles that
these agencies play.

Insofar as these offices all came

about as a result of the last major reorganization within

Massachusetts, the Willis-Harrington Study and Report 14

probably viewed the Commission as

a

,

all

possible agent of their

own demise.

Representatives of the media would certainly find themselves classified as outside forces also.

Their portrayal

of the activities of the Commission would provide a critical

interface between the Commission and the world at large.
One of the most critical outside forces was time.

Although there seemed to be an abundance of that commodity
at the outset of the Commission's work, that situation did

not persist as the work of the Commission wore on.

There is no argument which would negate the fact that

10

the Special Commission had a tremendous
potential.

As this

dissertation progresses, it will be made apparent
what the
true contributions of the Commission were.
My direct approach in preparing this case study
of the

activities of the Special Commission on Reorganization has
consisted, and will consist, of the following:
1.

Attendance at Commission and subgroup meetings.

2.

Discussions with executive director and staff

members of Special Commission.
3.

Discussions with members of Special Commission.

4.

Review of notes, minutes, cassette recordings
and paper output of Commission and subgroups.

5.

Review of work of previous Special Commission on
Reorganization, and review of all previous

reorganization plans.
6.

Discussions with various members of the legislature

7.

10.
8.

.

Study of Commonwealth budgetary materials

covering the last several years.
Study of current educational institutions in the

Commonwealth and the workings of the systems to
which they belong.
9.

Study of the Massachusetts position in comparison
to the other forty-nine states relative to the

magnitude of funding of public higher education.
Vast amount of reading on many subjects including

11

governance, budget, reorganization methods, power,

management practices, marketing and many, many
others.
The author asks the reader to note the following
points.

The terms Commission, Special Commission and Special

Commission on Reorganization will be used throughout the

dissertation to represent the Special Commission on the
Reorganization of Higher Education.

The term full Commission

will be employed to distinguish the main body from either the
Boston subgroup or the Governance subgroup.
The term House will be considered synonymous with the

Massachusetts House of Representatives, and the term Senate
will be considered synonymous with the Massachusetts Senate.
The term Governor, unless otherwise designated, will

apply to Edward J. King.
Finally, the term Commonwealth will be synonymous only

with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in this dissertation.

CHAPTER
FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION:

I

I

THE INITIAL MEETING

On June 26, 1979, provision was made

(through a legis-

lative resolution) 15 for a Special Commission
to investigate
and study matters relative to the evaluation
and reorganization of public higher education in the
Commonwealth. Of

great interest to me was the stated need within
the resolve
for "improving the structure of public higher
education in

the Commonwealth." 16

The resolve also set a mandatory date

for the receipt of the Commission's first report.

Drafts of

possible legislation which would emanate from the Special
Commission were to accompany the first report.
The date of filing was set for December

5,

1979.

Un-

fortunately, the first meeting of the Special Commission
took place on November 14, 1979, some 141 days after the

passage of the resolution, and only 21 days before the mandated initial report.

As a matter of fact, the first in-

terim report of the Special Commission was given
tion date of June 30, 1980.

a

publica-

(Some legislation resulting

from the Commission's work was produced in late spring,
1980)

.

This procrastination inherent in the late start

established

a

the lateness.

beginning of the Commission that was marred by
If every available day of the Commission's

possible life had been utilized from the beginning of eligible time

(June 26,

1979)

until the actual end (June 11, 1980)
12

13

the Commission could have had a
working life of 351 days
instead of 210.
It is most interesting to
speculate on what

might have happened had the Commission
met for the additional days.
The chief reason for the late start
should probably be

attributed to the failure of the Commonwealth's
chief executive, Governor King, to make the majority
of
his ten

appointments until October 12, 1979.

This delay was the

chief reason accompanying other circumstances
regarding the
late start which cost the Commission an increase of
up to

sixty-seven percent in working time.
The late appointments of the Governor were further

compounded by the fact that of the original ten appointed
by the Governor, three failed to compile positive attend-

ance records.
One never appeared, and was replaced in January, 1980;

one attended four meetings
1980)

(the last one was February 21,

and was replaced in May, 1980; one never appeared, and

was never replaced (thus causing a complete gap of one

possible spot)
The backgrounds of the gubernatorial appointees are

interesting to peruse.

Some backgrounds indicated great

potential strength for the Commission.
The Honorable Foster Furcolo had served as Governor

of the Commonwealth from 1957

-

1961, and is regarded by

many as being the father of the community college system in

14

Massachusetts
George Hazzard had served as president
of one of the
top private engineering schools in
the East, (Worcester
Polytechnic Institute). The Honorable John
Collins had
served as Mayor of Boston, and James Hammond
was appointed
to serve on the 1979 Commission while
concurrently serving
as Chancellor of the Massachusetts State
College system.

Only one gubernatorial appointment to this
Commission
had served on the previous Commission (formed in
1977) as
well.

Dr.

Francis Sherry was not an original appointee to

1977 Commission, but was named by Governor Dukakis to

fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of James Bailey.

Eight House members and four Senate members serving on
the 1979 Commission had also served on the 1977 Commission?' 7
Thus, the legislative members were well acquainted with the

Special Commission's purpose.
The Commission staff members appeared to be well

chosen for the task ahead.
Richard Hailer, Executive Director, had been inter-

viewed by the previous Special Commission, and had formerly
served as Assistant Secretary of Educational Affairs in

Massachusetts.

A former Director in the United States

Peace Corps, Richard exhibited a great deal of serenity

throughout the entire life of the Commission, and probably
could be correctly deemed one of the most stabilizing influences during the period November, 1979 to June, 1980.

15

Two of the other staff members
had also worked for the
previous Special Commission, and all of
the additional staff
had previously been employed by, or
served on, at least one
Commonwealth board or agency, so the apparent
level of exP er tise among the staff was high.
A great deal of practical experience was
brought to the

Commission by the presence of Laura Clausen,
Gregory Anrig
and Charles Johnson, the ex officio members.
(A

list of the regular and ex officio members of
the

1979 Commission, their titles

(if applicable)

lengths of service will be found in Appendix

and their
B)

At this point in time, in spite of the lateness of the

appointments

,

and the resulting terrible time lag between the

potential beginning of the Commission and the actual inception, it would seem to the casual observer that the Comm-

ission might still have a chance of success.
However, it sometimes seems that previous experiences
leave lasting impressions.

All levels of this present

Special Commission (staff, gubernatorial appointments,

legislative appointments) had at least one member who was

affiliated with the previous Special Commission.

Therefore,

before examining the record of the current Special Commission, it would be wise to examine the record of the previous

Special Commission to determine what the circumstances of
its existence had been.

An exhaustive search for official

minutes produced little result.

The only available record

16

of the previous Commission was located
in the office of the

current Commission.

According to those records, the 1977

Special Commission held only three full meetings
in 1973.
(The current Commission would hold eleven
full Commission

meetings and eighteen subgroup meetings)
The first two meetings in 1978 of the previous
Special

Commission were roughly four months apart, with the first
one taking place in May.
The second meeting, on September 13, 1978, found two

major items put into action.
First, the full Commission, at the request of Rep.

James Collins

committee

(Amherst)

,

voted to form an executive

.

Second, the executive committee was given two charges:
1*

Prepare with the assistance of staff a document

describing the status of public higher education, and
mail to all Commission members for their review prior
to the Commission meeting of November 14,
2.

1978.

Lay the groundwork for the job description of an

executive director to be employed by the Commission.
At the November 14, 1973 meetina of the full Commission

(the last full meeting of this Commission,

incidentally),

no mention was made in the minutes of the meeting about any

document related to the then current status of public
higher education.
Instead, the executive committee reported that they

17

had met

,

formed a job description for the position of

executive director, and had posted that job description.
It was noted that approximately 130 applications had been

received.

The Commission wanted to hire an executive

director, and asked that ten finalists be submitted to it.

Although the executive committee met several more
times, nothing came to fruition as a result of its work, and

the efforts of the 1977 Special Commission ended without

ceremony or completion.
The overall record of the previous Special Commission

was not impressive by any standards.

And, in light of the

quantity of members and staff serving on the current Special

Commission who served on or with the previous one
fifteen people are involved

— if

(at least

one counts those as well

with some limited interaction relative to the previous
Commission, the total number gets close to twenty) it is

important here to note the following:
1.

Senator Boverini, Chairman of the current Special

Commission, also served as Chairman of the previous
one
2.

Four members of the Senate and eight members of

the House, serving on the present Special Commission,

also served on the previous Commission.
3.

Two staff members of the present Commission

served for the previous Commission.
4.

The Governor was tardy in making his appointments

18

to the Commission.

Even prior to the first meeting of the
current Special
Commission rumblings protesting reorganization
were heard,
and, on other fronts, reorganization was
being called for.
,

Many people felt that the thrust of public higher

education within Massachusetts lacked direction and coordination, and these same people felt that public higher

education lacked overall coordination.
Special examples of items which were drawing the ire
of many included poorly constructed college and university

buildings, and charges of incorrect use of discretionary
funds by some of the presidents in the state college system.

For instance, on June 21, 1979, the state college

presidents came under a great deal of fire from the Massachusetts Legislative Committee on Post Audit and Oversight
for "wrong" use of discretionary funds. 19
Then, approximately a month before the first meeting

of the Special Commission, the library at the University of

Massachusetts, Amherst, began to shed its bricks, resulting
in a temporary closing of the library.

Even though the

reason causing closing was not primarily a function of the
University, the incident again found people looking criti-

cally at another example of failure in what people loosely
.

called higher education.

20

Conversely, and interestingly, at its August 29, 1979

meeting, the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees

19

voted to strongly support the status quo of
its operations,
and took the occasion to warn against any severance
and/or
isolation of the Boston Campus from the University.

(The

entire text is found in Appendix C.)
A close neighbor of Massachusetts, Connecticut, was
also doing a public higher education reorganization plan at
the same time as Massachusetts.

The Connecticut Board of

Higher Education, under pressure from its legislature to

present a reorganization plan, planned to act on several
drastic and major reorganization changes within the state.
Many in Massachusetts, including some legislators, ex-

pressed great interest in the Connecticut study.
A quote from The Emerging State College seemed to

correctly refer to a condition which many people suspected
was rampant in Massachusetts.

"...if higher institutions

of a system are permitted to develop without overall coor-

dination, the tendency is for various institutions to

compete for students, to duplicate expensive programs, and
to incur unnecessary building and campus expenses."

22

The Special Commission members would find themselves

studying many reorganization proposals that had been intro-

duced over the last few years.

None had ever been put into

practice, and they all enjoyed another common factor as well.
All proposals called for major changes in Massachusetts

higher education.
a

Obviously, all of the proposals reflected

general feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo of

20

current systems.
Senate Bill 1371, introduced by
Kevin Harrington in
1976, called for the formation of a
twenty-eight member
board of trustees to run the college
and university system
of Massachusetts. 23 Under this
proposal, the board of trustees would have disbursing power of all
system monies, and all
existing segments would merge into one. A
post secondary
education commission would work with the board
of trustees,
and would in effect, become the equivalent
of an accreditation agency of state government.

Harrington

s

plans called for five university centers,

and gave the board of trustees complete autonomy to
manipu1^^-®

funding.

In addition, the Board of Higher Education

was to be absorbed by the post secondary education commission.
The proposed measure, as submitted by Harrington, also

allowed for student and faculty representation on individual

institutional councils.
House Bill 5756, first submitted to the legislature
by Governor Dukakis in April 1977, also proposed to abolish
the Board of Higher Education, suggested a Board of Over-

seers which contained among other members the Massachusetts

Secretary of Education and allowed for Advisory Commissions?^
A later version of the Dukakis Bill (by Secretary Parks)

suggested regional organization under

a

central Board of

25
„
Overseers

Kermit Morrissey, as President of Boston State College,
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in 1977 proposed that a single Board of
Regents of twenty-

one members replace all present governing
boards and the

Board of Higher Education.
state colleges stand alone.

Morrissey proposed that the
2^

The fourth and last proposal that

I

will refer to here

is the Board of Higher Education proposal of August
31,
27
1979.

Under that proposal's direction, there would be six

separate boards under the supervision of a strengthened

Board of Higher Education, and the office of Executive

Secretary of Education would be abolished.
The dissertation will illustrate the intrinsic diffi-

culty that the members of the Commission experienced in

attempting to assimilate the above information.
Obviously, it was to prove just as difficult for the

Commission's staff to find the best manner of presenting
this voluminous material to the Commission.
This chapter will end with a survey of the first meeting of the Special Commission.

November 14, 1979.

The meeting was held on

The date was especially meaningful, be-

cause it marked the span of exactly one year from the date
of the third and final full Commission meeting of the pre-

vious Special Commission.
The Senate members had the best attendance record for
the first meeting, with all members from that body present.
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The House of Representatives delegation
produced an eighty
percent attendance rate and three out of
ten gubernatorial
appointees were missing.
The first meeting was fairly promising.

The action of

the Commission resulted in Senator Walter
Boverini being

elected Chairman, and Representative Frank Matrango
being
elected Co-Chairman.
Then, in a move which allowed for integration of
the

previous Special Commission's work, Richard Hailer was

appointed Executive Director of the Special Commission.
Finally, it was agreed that objectives dealing with a
final report of the Commission should be clearly delineated.

Before the first meeting adjourned, it was agreed that
heads of the various segments were to be invited to attend
future meetings in order to explain missions and goals of

their individual segments, both current and futuristic.
The next chapter will record the progress of the Com-

mission through its next twenty-eight meetings.

CHAPTER

III

PRESENTATIONS TO THE COMMISSION
Any study of the Special Commission must
not only concentrate on the Commission's efforts and
accomplishments,
but also on the number of meetings that took
place, and

their frequency, and the results of those meetings.
To show part of what

I

am referring to, the full

Commission met six times between November 14, 1979 and February 14, 1980.
The shortest period of time between any two
consecutive meetings was ten days.

The longest period of

time between any two consecutive meetings was twenty-eight

days

From February 14, 1980 to June 11, 1980, the Commission met as a full group only five times, and in all but one
case, there

v/as

almost a gap of one month between consecutive

full Commission meetings.
It should be noted,

in all fairness, that some eigh-

teen subgroup meetings were held, but

I

could not help

looking back at the dismal record of the previous Commission,
and noting the fact that according to available records that
I

could find, only three full meetings were ever held by

that body, and everything else was directed to an executive

member of the 1977 Special Commis-

committee subgroup.

(A

sion told me in 1978

(September)

that that person felt that

the progress of the Commission was critically slow, and even
23
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expressed doubt that the leadership of
the Commission had
actually wanted to get anything done.)
Perusal of the
record of the 1977 Commission tends to bear
out that doubt
of the 1977 Commission member.
However, the status of the Special Commission as
of

December

6,

1979 appeared

cause for optimism.
a

(on the surface,

anyway) to be

A course of action had been formed, and

schedule was in the process of being formed whereby the

heads of segments and agencies would define the mission of
their segments and agencies for the members of the Special

Commission.

Prior to describing these special presentations in

specific terms,

tations

I

will give an overview of the total presen-

.

First, no segmental or agency presentation was as

complete, as effective or as penetrating as it could or

should have been.

Most of the presentations were made in a

way that suggested deep servitude to the Commission,

a lack

of faith in what was being said, no ability to dominate the

atmosphere of the occasion, and an extremely defensive
attitude
Obviously, the attitude, the posture, and what the
U.S. Marine Corps called "presence" can make a decided dif-

ference in the overall assessment of how a Special Commission
will regard representatives of components of an educational
system.

My impressions after observing the presentations
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to the Special Commission led
me to believe that the Special

Commission members were not impressed or
enthralled with most
of the presidential deliveries.
To digress for a moment,

I

feel that public higher

education in Massachusetts has suffered for many
years because the hierarchy of the segments was reluctant
to take

an active role in telling the legislature what
was needed

(really needed)

to effectively maintain and improve our

system of public higher education in the Commonwealth.
Abbs and Carey take the view that there is a vast

difference between

a

university president who is keenly

aware of a state legislature, and one who lets the state

legislature run the ship.

it's quite apparent that few

presidents within the system have the clout to actively engage in a battle with the legislature.

(One of the excep-

tions to that statement could be the current president of
Q

2
Holyoke Community College).*"'

Abbs and Carey also state that a leader does not just

minister to organizational equilibrium, but gives specific
direction.^

0

Little if any direction was exhibited by the

presidents and other presenters before the Special Commission.

A lack of direction at the hearings might indicate

that it is not present otherwise.
The mechanics of the presentations may be summarized
as follows:
1.

Main speaker appeared with one or more colleagues
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before the Special Commission.
A fact book concerning the institution/system was

2.

prepared for the occasion and distributed.
Remarks were made by the president and/or col-

3.

leagues
4

.

Visual presentations were made to augment the

.

speaker's material.

Questions from the Commission members were

5.

answered.
The presentations were subject to physical and psycho-

logical constraints.
It was difficult because of some room layouts for the

presenters to even establish or maintain good eye contact

with the Commission members.

The lighting arrangements were

most difficult, the slide shows were not able to be shown
with maximum clarity, and the images themselves were often

keystoned as well.
It is no wonder that after all presentations were de-

livered a general feeling of relief seemed to pervade the
room.

However, it would have been possible

(with some ad-

equate planning) to overcome some of the inherent space

problems

David Schuman's axiom (repeated in lectures and

.

books) that "If you make the rules you win the game" would
be well used as a daily reminder by those who have to make
_
presentations
.

,
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Of even more importance is the question— What good

did these presentations do the Commission?
The presentations of the segments of higher education
the Executive Office of Educational Affairs and the Board of

Higher Education took about a total of fifteen hours of the

Commission's time, and, in a linear time frame, were given
over a time span of seventy days.
So, after ninety-two days of potential activity, the

Commission had met six times, elected

a

Chairman and Co-

Chairman, elected an Executive Director, arranged for visits
by segmental and agency heads, and listened to (and watched)

the representatives of the Board of Higher Education, the

Executive Office of Educational Affairs, the Massachusetts
State College System, The Massachusetts Board of Regional

Community Colleges, Southeastern Massachusetts University,

University of Lowell and the University of Massachusetts.
The presentations deserve examination, even though the

format was pretty universal.

All extolled the virtues of

the respective systems, and all lamented what couldn't be

done because of lack of money.
The presentations of Chancellor of the 3oard of Higher

Education Laura Clausen, and of Educational Affairs Secretary Charles M. Johnson were given with full knowledge that
several reorganization proposals over the last few years
have suggested the ouster of both agencies.
time frame was no exception.

The current
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The presentation of the State
College System took on
a slightly different approach
because the presenter.

Chancellor Hammond, was also
the Commission.

(No

a

gubernatorial appointee to

matter how objective Chancellor Hammond

was capable of being, and no matter
how pure his intentions,
his participation as a presenter was
marred because of his

involvement with the segment coupled with his
membership on
the Commission.
It was a most untenable situation
for the

Chancellor, and a poor situation for the Commission.)

Although planning was alluded to in most presentations,
none utilized it as a subject more than the
presentation of

Laura Clausen, Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education.
However, the need for long range planning never became too

serious a subject for the Special Commission until near the

end of its deliberations in May and June, 1980.
In contrast to the light treatment accorded planning

by the Special Commission much has been written on the sub-

ject by writers of public higher education policy and

practices.

Some excerpts are listed here.

In the book Public Financing of Higher Education

,

the

Tax Foundation directors feel that institutions should

develop master plans based on regional as well as state
needs,

32

and Palola suggests planning ranges of 1-4 years,

5-25 years and 26-50 years.
Eut, it's tough to implement a master plan even if it's

possible to write one.
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Etzioni, in 1963, pointed out that
"fifteen and ten
years ago underdeveloped countries
were formulating master
plans for their modernization. Fewer
than one out of ten
were implemented even in part." 34

Master plans are easily violated, also.

After the

occasion of a master plan in education for
North Carolina
was short-circuited by political connection,
one college
president in that state said:
"The whole master plan is
going to be useless if it is clear that
educational issues
are settled in the state legislature by the
political

process.

7s

Finally, a master plan should not be viewed as

a

means

of saving money, but, rather, as pointed out in Berdahl

it

,

may be a means of increasing expenditures "...because of

bringing together needs in a clear comprehensive whole.
The new year officially opened for the Commission with
a meeting which featured a presentation of data concerning

the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges.

The presenters were both former legislators.

John Buckley,

interim president of the community college system, gave

a

soft sell approach which quietly extolled the advantages of
the community college systems.

David Bartley, President of

Holyoke Community College, followed with a hard sell

approach relative to the economic linkages of community
colleges with their surrounding communities.

This observer

noted the uncommonly warm reception that these two presidents
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received from the legislators present, and both (especially

President Bartley) basked in the situation which allowed
them to make their presentations in very familiar surroundings.

No other president or presenter fared as well.

It

was prophetic because the old saying that "The legislature

takes care of its own" seemed to be working,

a

grim reminder

that this Special Commission was operating within a system

controlled by the legislature.
Four days after the Buckley-Bartley presentation, the

Boston Globe's Muriel Cohen wrote

a

comprehensive article

regarding the consolidation of Boston public colleges, and
the headline stated that it was considered "inevitable" by
(The outside forces were beginning to move.)

some.

The meeting of January 14, 1980 dealt with many subjects, and for the first twenty-five minutes was a rambling

affair.

After mention and discussion of several subjects

such as building authorities, elimination of programs,

curriculum and evaluation of institutions. Mayor Collins
cautioned that the Commission not go in too many directions.
Dr.

Sherry spoke up strongly in favor of subcommittees.

Senator D'Amico, in a prophetic move, suggested that the

Commission deal with Boston first.

whether to take Boston first or not.

Discussion followed on
At this point the

Committee moved into action, and began to talk about the
Boston situation.
Senator Boverini cautioned the Commission that if they
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don’t do Boston, people might say that
they were ducking it,
and questioned if people might say that
Finnegan, McGee,
Bulger and Atkins can reorganize without
the Commission. 38
The rest of the meeting dealt with "getting
the

Commission's act together," basically by agreeing
to set up
subcommittees, and going in what the Commission members

and

staff felt was a positive direction.
The meeting closed with three items that deserve
re-

cording

.

1.

Dr.

Hazzard and Mayor Collins urged the Commission

to move with greater speed.
2.

Chairman Boverini stated to the Commission that

even though he had been asked if the Commission could

meet every week, he had many other meetings to attend
dealing with many other subjects.
3.

Again, Senator Boverini

(along with Representative

James Collins and Senator D'Amico) stated that if this

Commission doesn't do something with Boston, someone
will.
On the evening of January 14, 1980, Governor Edward J.

King delivered his annual State Address, and the following
items within his speech were of particular interest.
"Of particular importance is reform of our Civil

Service system and elimination of waste and duplication in
our state colletes and universities.
are now reviewing these problems.

Two Special Commissions

(Next paragraph from

32

original text has been omitted.)
Our public colleges have a tradition of academic ex-

cellence.

We shall maintain this tradition, but in a way

which both student and taxpayers can afford.
We urge each Commission to report its findings and file

legislation for action in this year's legislative session.
The Governor's request could not be misinterpreted.
It was a call for quick action.

The same request had been

made that afternoon by Commission members Hazzard and
Collins (John).

Up to this point, the requests/admonitions

were ignored.
The last two meetings at which presentations were

given (Southeastern Massachusetts University and the University of Lowell on 1/24/80 and University of Massachusetts
on 2/14/80) were not marked by any noticeable changes from
the first presentation.

Between the two meetings, however. House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman John Finnegan publicly stated,
"It's clear we have more physical facilities for higher

education than we need." 40

Again, Chairman Finnegan was

showing that his assault on public higher education was
serious, and he showed that he was unafraid to send barbed

messages into the "enemy camp."

A serious condition existed

which the Commission members largely chose to ignore

—

Finnegan's remarks caused consternation among the Commission's
members, but the Commission's activities didn't seem to be
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bothering Chairman Finnegan at all.
questions.

it raised serious

Who was really in charge?

Who had the clout?

Of all the presentation meetings, the last
one

(February 14) was the most important, for it was
at that

meeting that several important things occurred.
1*

Janet Robinson was appointed to the Commission to

replace Wayne Budd.
2.

Former Governor Foster Furcolo submitted a re-

organization plan of his own to the Commission.
3.

A Boston subcommittee was formed, and the young

and enterprising Senator from Worcester, Gerard D'Amico,

was named Chairman.
4.

A Governance subcommittee was formed, and Dr.

Francis Sherry was named Chairman.
This meeting closed with an upbeat feeling among the

participants, but two warnings of caution were given by

Chairman Boverini.

He suggested a close relationship be-

tween the Commission, the legislature and the Governor, and
he again reiterated what had been said a couple of meetings

before

—

package)

"If we don't do it

(the entire reorganization

it's going to be done."

In the first part of his remarks, at the end of the

meeting. Chairman Boverini might well have been referring
to a quote that appeared in Berdahl

'

s

book on statewide

planning stating that any growth of cooperation between
higher education and government will depend on the avail-
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ability of a mechanism to encourage cooperation

.

^

Unfor-

^

tunately, the record will show that no real linkage was
ever

established by the Commission with the legislature

—a

deadly

mistake
The second part of the Chairman's statement only bore

out what he and others had succinctly stated before.

Plenty

of enemies existed in outside forces, and they meant business.

CHAPTER

I

V

NEW DIRECTIONS

This chapter will cover the total time span measured
from February 21, 1980 until March 27, 1980.

However, in

order for me to effectively document the work of the newly
formed subgroups, and at the same time relate it to the
of the full Commission,

I

shall refer to three seoarate

time spans as listed below:
Span

I

February 21, 1980 to March

6,

1980

Span II

March 13, 1980 (morning and afternoon).

Span III

March 20, 1980 to March 27, 1980

Obviously, the Commission staff was at work for more

than the listed dates above, but

I

am using the dates of

meetings as benchmarks for the three time spans.
Before embarking on a study of the specific time spans,
I

would like to interject

to the reader.

a

summary that could be of interest

As of the date of the last meeting of the

Commission (February 14, 1980), the Commission had completed
its ninety-second day, and had met as a group for a total

of approximately twenty hours.

This works out to about an

average of thirteen minutes per day.

Common practice in-

dicates that any project normally exerts

a

tremendous amount

of excitement at the beginning of the endeavor.
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However, no
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welling of excitement seemed to be taking
place among the
Commission members. The reader will recall that
in Chapter
III I cited the failure of Chairman Boverini
to want

to meet

on a weekly basis.

The implication of that attitude was now

beginning to take on a great importance.
on the outside watched.

.

Meanwhile, people

.and waited.

Time Span

I

The newly formed Governance committee met on February
21,

1980.

The first impression one would have felt at that

first Governance meeting was that much time remained to make

decisions.

The initial pace of the meeting was slow, and it

was indicated that "at some point" the Commission wants to
talk to national experts. 42

The feeling of ample time pre-

vailed.

During the discussion. Governor Foster Furcolo made
me listen carefully when he qualified a statement with,

"...when the time comes if we ever get to the point of

making final recommendations...".

And, Representative

William Mullins expressed anger and frustration during this
meeting, saying "We're spinning our wheels.

Where the hell

are we going?"

These were early signs that the Commission was not

going to find its task easy.

This was the ninety-ninth day

of the Commission's existence, and it was apparent that no

clear direction was being pointed out
by the leadership.
During this first Governance meeting,
Dr. Sherry
attempted to exert moderate control over
the pace and content of the meeting.
However, the meeting was managed, to a
great extent,
by the input of Laura Clausen, Gregory
Anrig and Arnold

Friedman.

Additionally, William Mullins kept inserting re-

flections upon the quality of effort and work of
the trustee
of public higher education.
Representative Mullins blasted
the past role of some trustees, and especially some
former

trustees of Westfield State College. 43
Other suggestions were made during the meeting, and

while all were positive they served to keep the Commission
at a standstill while all were being considered.

Some of

the suggestions offered are listed below.
1.

Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education Laura

Clausen urged that the subgroup list objectives.
(Again,

I

point out that this suggestion was made on

the ninety-ninth day of the Commission's existence.
The reader will recall reading in Chapter II that a

call was given to formulate objectives governing the
final report of the Commission.

As far as

I

knew

ninety-nine days after that first meeting, those requested items had not been produced.

Nov;,

here was

the same call being given again)
2.

Commissioner of Education Gregory Anrig suggested
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that a summary of all reorganization
proposals be made,
and that the Governance subgroup focus on
the differ-

ences between and among the proposals.
3.

Arnold Friedman made the suggestion that the sub-

group meet with faculty and students, and wanted to

know why all of public higher education is not being

coordinated together instead of the present system of
competition among segments.
The meeting closed on one positive note as well as a

recurring frightening one.
First, some agreement finally surfaced when Governance

committee members agreed to study reorganization proposals
for the next meeting, and, after discussion, to give con-

sideration to evaluating the Board of Higher Education and

Secretary of Education as well as agreeing to bring in some
"experts" to aid the Governance subcommittee.
Second, and probably more important, a state of

reality was again stressed by Commission Chairman Walter
Boverini when he told the Commission members on the Governance subcommittee that something is going to happen from

within (the Commission)

^

or without.

Both Senator Boverini

and Representative Mullins cautioned their Governance com-

mittee colleagues not to underestimate the power of the
House and Senate Ways and Means Committees.
A week after the initial meeting of the Governance

subcommittee. Chairman Gerard D'Amico met on February 23,
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1980 for the first time with members
of the Boston subcommittee.
Six Boston centers of public higher
education

were represented at this meeting, and the
head of each
institution reacted as one would expect. Certainly,
the

majority of the six heads were not too happy to
speak of
45
specific merger plans.
Although Kermit Morrissey, the President of Boston
State College soon would be leaving that post to become

Assistant to Human Services Secretary Charles Mahoney, he
testified relative to reorganization of public higher
education.

His stated preference was to have a statewide

reorganization take place first, and then have

Boston

a

reorganization take place.
Other comments from the assembled presidents were

quite parochial.

President Shivelev of Bunker Hill Community College

extolled the virtues of Bunker Hill's Learning Center,
terming it the "most extensive teaching-learning center in
this country."

His colleague. President Haskins of Roxbury

Community College launched a heated attack on remaining
color policies within the Commonwealth, and, in

a

statement

backed up by statements from Representative Mel King, said
that his facilities needed better access as well as improve-

ment because his people were poor.
President McKenzie of Massachusetts Bay Community
College praised the role of his institution, and sounded in
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no way receptive to any proposed
merger.

President Nolan of the Massachusetts
College of Art
also expressed resistance to reorganization
when he called
for the preservation of the independence
of the Massachusetts College of Art, and the need for
separate laboratory
facilities
The only two presidents who discussed any
merger plans
on any type of a positive note were President
Morrissey and

Chancellor Corrigan, with Morrissey suggesting a merger
of

University of Massachusetts/Boston State and Massachusetts
College of Art

and Corrigan stating that any merger has to

be approached cautiously.

Representative James Collins queried the presidents
about the possible savings to be gained by consolidation.

Almost all the presidents responded in
(but civilized)

a

highly ferocious

manner that money is important, but should

not be the main question.

Senator D'Amico interjected, at this point,

a

statement

offering opportunities for massive input to the Boston subgroup and emphasized the importance of bringing all facts
about Boston forward so that full disclosure can ensue.
D'Amico was pleased to suggest that this Boston sub-

committee forum provided an excellent opportunity for constituency groups to make their feelings known to the Commission

D'Amico strongly stated that we (the Commission)^ are
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prepared to reject any attempt at any
level to circumvent
the work of this subgroup until
as much data as possible
has been collected.
I feel positive that this
statement
was made with less actual certainty
than was
implied.

Senator D'Amico had to know what was
happening with outside
forces, and so this statement was
unnecessary.

Another false note of optimism was introduced
by
Representative James Collins. He seemed to think

that the

work of the Boston committee would be quick
to bring to
finality, because he indicated in his remarks

that in terms

of a final report,
^ bi-P

"maybe in a month." it's important to get

picture of what's going on in Boston.
The meeting closed on a positive note.

A motion was passed to visit all Boston campuses within the month of March.

Commission Executive Director Richard Hailer exhorted
the Commission to ask only important questions on their

visits
And, in a concession to Dr. Hazzard's zeal for moving

right along. Senator D'Amico noted that "President Hazzard

keeps us on the move." 47

It is important to note yet

another warning from Dr. Hazzard.
The Boston subgroup held one more meeting (March 6,
1980)

prior to the full Commission meeting of March 13th.

Two community colleges were toured, Roxbury and Bunker Hill.

Both visits allowed student, faculty and administrative

42

leaders to plead for their respective colleges.

At Roxbury,

Representative Mel King decried the political aura
surrounding any decision regarding Roxbury Community

College.

However, no novel ideas were generated at either
site, so
the most obvious advantage of the Commission visit
was to

gain insight into what Bunker Hill and Roxbury were like.
Time Span II

The seventh full Commission meeting of the Special

Commission was held on March 13, 1980 at the University of
Massachusetts/Boston.

Only six members of the Commission

plus the Commissioner of Education, his deputy and the

Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education were in attendance for this meeting.

A seventh member of the Commission

appeared less than thirty seconds before the end of the
meeting, although he was later listed as present.
The mood of the meeting could be described as both

lighthearted and apprehensive at the same time.

The

apprehensiveness came about because of the rumor that
number of students were going to stage

a

a

march that day,

and some members of the Commission felt that their meetinq

would become one of the stopping points of the students.
The lightheartedness sprang from the conduct of the meeting.

Early in the meeting. Commission member Arnold Friedman
asked if there were any cooperation among the segmental
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building authorities
Building Authority.

State College System and State College

,

Trustee John Cataldo replied that there

was as much cooperation among segmental
building authorities
as there was among trustees.
This answer drew a big laugh.
The mood prevailed throughout the testimony
of Messrs.

Cataldo and Stuart, 4 8 and probably accounted for
the lack of
substantive questions asked of the two gentlemen.
The Dover Project 4 9 was brought up by Mr. Friedman,

but any serious inquiry into the full nature and philosophy
of the project never materialized.

A planned appearance by a Harvard professor, who had

been scheduled to speak on the subject of enrollment projections, never materialized 50
.

While the meeting moved at a very slow pace to completion, two reports were presented to the Commission.

Dr.

Francis Sherry reported on the progress of the Governance
subgroup, and promised that everyone would have input.

Senator D'Amico reported on the progress of the Boston subgroup, and repeated the intention of the committee to visit
all six Boston public higher education campuses.
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The meeting finally started to steer in a fairly

serious direction when Executive Director Richard Hailer
took the occasion to mention key areas for the Commission's

consideration
Energy
Financial Aid
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Capital Outlay

Student Services

Five-Year Plan
Richard Hailer also mentioned that the staff members
were getting phone calls telling them to expedite the
Drocess.
(No

identities of the callers were disclosed.)
During the discussion led by Dr. Hailer, Chancellor

Clausen stated that she hoped to be able to refine data on

population projections by May, 1980.

This would prove to

be a date too late for all practical purposes.

The importance of timely planning was accentuated

when Arnold Friedman, on this 120th day of the Commission's
existence, asked for information about other state systems.
The reply was made by Dr. Hailer that only partial reports

were available.
Mr.

Hazzard)

,

Friedman (with the agreement of Drs. Sherry and
stated that he felt that the Commission was getting

into the study of too many intricate details.

Both he and

Senator Olver requested information on what other states were
doing
The meeting ended inauspiciously
On the afternoon of March 13, 1980, the Boston sub-

group held its scheduled meeting at the Harbor Campus of the

University of Massachusetts.

Chancellor Robert Corrigan and

President David Knapp led the delegation of University of

Massachusetts/Boston faculty and administrators who were
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present to provide information.

As he did in the first

Boston subgroup meeting. Chancellor
Corrigan emphasized
that merger of some Boston institutions
could be a possibility.
Other members of the administration, faculty,
staff

and students contributed items to the
Commission members.

Throughout the first part of the meeting, the
shouts
of marching and protesting students could be
heard,

and it

was evident by the sudden appearance of what seemed
to be

security personnel that some students wanted access to
the

meeting and to the Commission, and that access was not to be
granted easily or immediately.
Finally, in a move that could have (and should have)

been granted immediately, the students who had participated
in the march were allowed to speak to the Commission.

Their

subject was a plea for increased quality of Commonwealth
education.

The remainder of the meeting was devoted to

specific admissions data pertinent to Boston State and the

University of Massachusetts/Boston.
The meeting ended on the afternoon of the 120th day.

The Commission did not know it, but only ninety days of

meaningful existence were left for it.
Time Span III

Additional meetings of the Boston subgroup and

Governance subgroup were held in March, 1980.
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The March 20, 1980 meeting of the
Boston group was
held at Boston State College, and the
thoroughness of prep-

aration by Boston State for the Commission
visit matched the
thoroughness of the Boston State College
President's Report
mentioned in Chapter II. 52 The meeting provided
a forum
which allowed expansion of the college traits
first presented at the initial Boston subgroup meeting.
Dr.

Rothermel

,

a Boston State faculty member,

2

began

the forum by noting demographic facts unique to Boston
State,

such as the fact that about half of the students at Boston

State apply only to that institution, and almost half of the

students come right from Boston.

He was followed by other

speakers who spoke on specific college programs, including

cooperative education 54 and teacher education, including

involvement in the National Teacher Corps program.
Dr.

Carl Cedargren 55 blasted the unfounded statements

that have been cited relative to Boston State.

He bemoaned

the situation that would occur if Boston State were eliminated, such as the probable loss of the opportunity for

thousands of students to attend a four-year college.

Dr.

Cedargren took great umbrage at the proliferation of apparent
facts generated by UMass/Boston in an attempt to show that

UMass/Boston could absorb Boston State.

Dr.

Cedargren closed

his remarks with the suggestion that UMass/Boston be absorbed
by the State College System, using differences in per student

cost as one aspect of his assertion.
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Wear the end of the meeting Senator
D'Amico told the
assemblage that his subgroup would be
back to Boston State.
A particularly significant moment
was reached during
the proceedings when subgroup Chairman
Senator D'Amico was
asked by a member of the audience if
the full Commission
could override the recommendations of
the Boston subgroup.
Senator D'Amico replied in the affirmative,
and further
indicated,
a very prophetic way, that the
General Court
could if it wished, override the recommendations
of the full

m

Commission
The meeting closed with many impassioned pleas
to

leave Boston State College as it was.
The same day found the Governance subgroup meeting
also.

It was the second meeting for the group, and marked

the end of a period of thirty days since that group's first

meeting
During the time between meetings, Commission subgroup

members had been expected to read and evaluate various

reorganization proposals that had been presented for their
review.

Janet Slovin was asked to review the proposals

(listed in Appendix

D)

for the Governance group.

Much of

the meeting was redundant in that the self-study material

assigned the Commission members was really only repeated in
its original form during the afternoon.
In my opinion, much of the time of this meeting could

have been spent more wisely.

The material for discussion could
have been organized
much more succinctly; in fact, had the
material been prepared for discussion in a much better
and more orqanized
fashion, it might have been possible to
give this material
to Commission members so that the
material was clearly

understandable in its printed form.
But, that was not done.

Instead, much of the valuable

time of the Commission was taken by participation
in a

poorly organized session.
The course of the meeting was choppy, with much darting back and forth from subject to subject.
It seemed to be a situation where the main theme of

the Commission kept being diverted into small and tenuous

channels
The meeting closed with a discussion of budget pro-

cesses and fiscal autonomy.
The reader will remember that

I

cited the vast impor-

tance of the legislature-controlled budget in the Intro-

duction to this dissertation.
tation,
and,

I

At that point in the disser-

pointed out that budgets created philosophies--

some of the philosophies created problems.
(As

I

observed the Commission at work,

really had

I

no assurance that all of the members really understood

budgets.

Hundreds of volumes have been written about

budgets and budget processes.

I

felt that required reading

for the Commission should have been 'Vildavskv

'

s

text The
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.

However, the Commis-

sion never dug too thoroughly into
the subject of budgets,
nor did they ever really address
the fundamental aspects of
fiscal autonomy.)

Appendix E contains some goals and objectives
for the
Governance subgroup.
The 134th day of the Commission's life
saw the Boston
subgroup hold its fourth March meeting at
a double location—

Massachusetts College of Art, and Massachusetts Bay
Community College.
The visit to the Massachusetts College of Art
drew

attention to the singularity of the institution, and
many
students gave impassioned pleas for the preservation of
the
school
In my opinion.

Representative Mel King contributed

the only item which made the meetina worthwhile, the only

criterion for the Commission to use in laying out the future
of higher education, in spite of pressure from the Governor

and legislature to save money and consolidate.

He urged the

students at Massachusetts College of Art to mobilize all the
students in Boston in order to impress the Commission and
the Governor and the legislature with the importance of the

need to preserve quality education and unique education in
Boston.

When the group visited Massachusetts Bay Community
College, Senator D'Amico broached the proposal of a greater
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Boston Community College— one that would
have several
campuses.
The reaction to his suggestion was

less than

positive.

This suggestion only proved to be one more
thing

to keep many public higher education members
from supporting

the Boston subgroup or the full Commission.

During the meeting Senator D'Amico stressed that he
was subjected to forces all the time urging consolidation of
the present behemoths of the public higher education system
in Massachusetts.

He claimed that the Senate Ways and Means Committee,

House Ways and Means Committee, Governor, and many newspaper

writers and editors were taking up the banner for consolidation.
The general tone of the meeting described Massachu-

setts Bay Community College as a unique place to provide the

services which it was able to provide.

President McKenzie chided the members of the Boston
subgroup who were absent, and strongly urged that the

governance of the entire state be worked out prior to the
Boston reorganization.

Summary of visitations:
All of the visitations were conducted by the members
of the subgroup in a slightly defensive manner, and in a

couple of instances the manner was quite defensive.
The quantity of representation of the Boston subgroup

was never what it should have been at any one meeting.
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Most of the visitations consisted of

a tour,

and then

dialogue between the Commission and the members
of the host
institution

a

The majority of dialogue generally consisted of

parochial arguments why the respective institutions being

visited should not be closed, or merged with others.
Senator D Amico

,

who chaired all of the Boston sub-

group meetings, divided his time in three ways while conducting the informational meetings.
1.

He alluded many times to the fact that outside

forces were acting on the Commission to urge faster

action, and he constantly referred to the real world

political situation that was shaping the Commission's
actions

While speaking at Massachusetts Bay Community College,
Senator D'Amico said that he personally preferred to

move more slowly in his deliberations, but the spectre
of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees

caused him and the Commission to move faster than he

desired
2.

He acted as the chairperson who directed activ-

ities, and spent much of his time keeping track of

those who wished to speak to the Commission, and spent
a great deal of time listening to those people.
3.

A great deal of time was spent in explanation of

why this subgroup of the Commission was looking at
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the Boston situation.

This put the Commission in the posi-

tion of almost apologizing for its presence.

Senator

D'Amico's engaging manner served him in good stead
during
these visits, because both the people being visited
and the

visitors reflected a great deal of the anxiety caused by the
sensation of outside forces getting ready to interfere.

CHAPTER

V

OUTSIDE FORCES INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO
CIRCUMVENT COMMISSION
This chapter will describe the
meetings and activities
of the Special Commission from April
3, 1980 to May 15, 1980,
or from the 141st day to the 183rd day.
The terminal date
of the chapter also marks the completion
of six months of
official existence of the Commission.
The Special Commission was running out of
time.

The

early delay was proving costly, more costly
than anyone
could have predicted, and the calendar and clock
inexorably
ground on.

Outside forces previously alluded to grew more

ominous and impatient, but the Commission continued to move
at an extremely slow pace.

of the important

This chapter will record some

(and not always beneficial events)

that

took place within the time frame referred to above.
1.

During this time period, the replacement of the

Honorable Foster Furcolo as a Commission member was effected.
The resignation of Foster Furcolo represented a dramatic

moment for the Commission, but most failed to realize its
full implications.

One of the ostensible reasons for the

departure from the Commission of Governor Furcolo was that
he was not able to continue on the Commission because of the

strenuous demands of Commission work on his time.
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In actual
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happening, the months of April and June,
1980 found Governor
Furcolo giving most freely (and charitably)
of his
time to

educational institutions, showing that the reason
alluded to
above was only an illusory one.
Certainly, an astute civil servant and realistic

political figure such as Foster Furcolo probably sensed
the
final outcome of the Special Commission's quest long
before
it actually took place.

My personal theory is that Governor

Furcolo recognized the inevitable, and left.

Events which

followed seem to lend support to the theory. 58

it was a

major mistake for the Commission to have set the stage for
Governor Furcolo

'

s

for the Commission

departure.

It was a huge tactical error

(and the Governor)

to have let his depar-

ture go without an attempt to convince him to stay.
2.

The next major event was the introduction of House

6200, the budget document of the House, with its outside

language concerning reorganization.

This document accentu-

ated the checkmate-in-progress situation applied by the outside forces.

Its presence quickly led to an evaluation of

techniques by the Special Commission.

However, no change in

tactics was noticed on the Commission's part.

Thus, without

a countering defense by the Commission against House 6200,

the onslaught of the House Bill was intensified.
3.

The third major event was the visit to the Commis-

sion by Governor Edward J. King.
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In a visit which was

supposed to indicate support for the original purpose of
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the Special Commission, only the most
ingenuous members of
the Commission could have found any hope
in the Governor's
message. The Governor's visit was one that
the Commission

would never forget.

He left only devastation after his

visit.
4.

It had become very clear by this calendar
date

that the enemies of the Commission had been clearly
identified.

Concurrently

,

the course chosen by the Commission

members had not produced any positive results.
a.

The biggest enemy of the Commission was time.

b.

The second enemy consisted of outside forces

that would have been happy to supersede the Com-

mission.

Some of these forces have been identi-

fied up to this point, and others will be identified in subsequent chapters.
c.
I

The third enemy of the Commission was ... itself

offer the identification of the third enemy not

in a deprecating sense but in an objective sense.

The Commission members, up to this point, had not

displayed a massive show of unity.

Because of this

lack of cohesiveness, it made the idea of circum-

venting the Commission much more possible than it
might have been on November 14, 1979.

In addition,

no major attempt had been made to link the work of

the Commission to a thrust of the legislature.

The Commission was, effectively, staying too inde-
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pendent.

Thus, without a large and powerful

legislative base on friendly terms with
the Commission, and without the active and full
support
of the House and Senate Ways and
Means Chairpersons
as well as the Governor, the struggle
became much

more difficult.
The chapter will be divided into three
segments.

Span

I

April

to April 10, 1980

3

Span II

April 17 to May

Span III

May 13 to May 15, 1980
Time Span

8,

1980

I

The first major item discussed at the April

3,

1980

Governance meeting was the lack of a coordinated system of

collecting information relative to public higher education
in Massachusetts.

(There shouldn't have been a lack because

current statutes do mandate the collecting of data by the
Board of Higher Education.

However, neither a system of

collection nor funds to support that system then existed.)
The topic led Arnold Friedman to call for coordination.
Dr.

George Hazzard questioned the need for planning

and coordination, though, when he asked what good it did to

bring up those subjects for discussion when it was evident
the legislature was the boss.

His sentiments were echoed

by Senator John Olver, who cautioned that an idealistic
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system might not work, even when it
was

a

well-planned one,

because individual institutions have their
champions.

No

answer to Dr. Hazzard's question was offered
that day, but
the events of June 10, 1980 provided an
all-encompassing
answer although a belated one.
Janet Slovin attempted to disseminate

a

vast quantity

of information to the Commission members relative
to dealing

with the question of segmental representation on the
board
of higher education, the concept of Divisions of
Continuing

Education and the question of planning and program policies.
fairness, the task was much too huge for either any

one person, or the method used.

Thus, the important value

of information was lessened by the slow and cumbersome

approach used.
During this meeting, the chairperson, Dr. Sherry,
stated that the committee should have its final report by

September
First,

"I

.

This optimistic assumption led to two others.

think it's safe to assume that the life of the

Commission will continue until its work is done."
Dr.

Second,

Sherry suggested that the Governance committee make

orderly plans, using as the rationale, "We've got plenty of
time

.

The meeting terminated shortly afterward.
At about the same time of this April

3,

1900 Gover-

nance meeting, University of Massachusetts President David

Knapp was addressing the issue of reorganization in

a

paper
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addressed to the Long-Range Planning Committee
of the
University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees,

(and one that

would be forwarded to the Special Commission if
the trustees
approved.)
One of the most interesting aspects of the paper
called for (if the Special Commission chose to do so)
action
b Y the Special Commission relative to requesting
detailed

plans from segments within sixty days of the request.

Using

^ realistic timetable of a total of ninety days from the

time of the Knapp Report to its possible adoption by the

trustees and the Commission, the request to the segments and
the full time limit allowed for answering by the segments,

this would have seen final action on this single suggested

phase by the first of July, 1980,

a

date we now know would

have been too late.
The other most interesting aspect of the Knapp Paper
(based upon a planning process between the Boston Campus

and the University Administration)

is that Boston State and

the Massachusetts College of Art would both, by inference,
be absorbed by the University of Massachusetts, Boston.

The report states that the Special Commission could con-

struct a configuration of public higher education institutions in the Boston area that could include:
1.

The University of Massachusetts at Boston as the

one four-year and graduate institution of higher

education expanded to include...
2.

...the current Massachusetts College of Art as a
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distinct unit.
3.

...additional and/or enlarged university
level
baccalaurate
and graduate programs adequate to
serve
the appropriate student populations in
the Greater

Boston Area.
The April

,

1980 issue of The Massachusetts Teacher
has

comprehensive article on Massachusetts Public
Higher
Education Reorganization which makes the following
obsera

,

vation—

"If reorganization cannot be effected in a
program-

matically sound manner, there is the danger that it will be
imposed on us through budgetary fiat in the Ways and Means
Committee.

That would be the worst scenario of all."^

The feelings suggested by the article in The Massachu—

Teacher took tangible shape with the passage of House
6200

through the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

The budget bill contained outside language related to major

public higher education reorganization, and was due to be

released to the public sometime during the day of April 10,
1980.

On this date the Special Commission held a full

Commission meeting.
The Commission members patiently sat through rather

lengthy presentations dealing with educationally oriented
topics which were given by Dr. Francis Keppel and Reverend

Michael Walsh, S.J.

.

Again, patience reigned as reports

from the Governance and Boston subgroups were presented.
(In his report.

Senator D'Amico predicted a final Boston
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subgroup report four to five weeks after April
17, 1980.)
Then, and only then, did the Special Commission ad^ r ®^s the issue of the House budget.

Several statements

were issued with much fervor.
1.

Senator D'Amico expressed great fears about the

reorganization process.
2.

Representative Matrango very perceptively stated

that the House had a "potentially evil" budget to work
on that was based upon the Ways and Means Committee

recommendation
3.

Laura Clausen added that she would not think too

highly of any attempt to circumvent the Commission.
The Commission discussed a motion presented by Dr.
Hazzard.

Dr. Hazzard wished to have all capital outlay

expenditures held until the Commission (around September)
makes its preliminary report.

The original motion was

kneaded (and greatly weakened) by a motion gaining the unanimous support of the Commission that cited its opposition
to any FY 1981 budget language that would preempt the Com-

mission's mission.

Letters would be sent to the Governor,

Speaker and Senate President.
One Commission member, who did not wish to be quoted,

said later that the Commission should have demanded the

appearance before it of Chairman John Finnegan at that point.
In fact,

stated this member, the Governor, and House and

Senate Ways and Means Chairmen, should have been "very
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strongly" requested to attend the
opening session of the
Commission on November 14, 1979 .)
During the discussion of the latest
House Ways and
Means maneuver. Senator John Olver
cautioned the group that
the Chairmen of the Ways and Means
Committees may not listen
The advice was sound, but undoubtedly
did not penetrate as
effectively as it should have. The Commission
at least
recognized the devastating implication of H6200,
but did
nothing to change course in order to adapt
to this threat to
the need for the Commission's existence.
(A concise description of both the contents of House 6200 and
the ramifications
.

of its final passage in the House will be found
in Appendix
K.)

Time Span II
Thus, the first meetings to take place after the

House had resolved its particular budget presentation had
to have been influenced heavily by that House action.

Taking the Governance subgroup meeting of 4/24/80
first, the subject of the recently passed House Bill 6200

did come up.

First, Commission Chairman Walter Boverini

opened the meeting by commending Commission member Arnold
Friedman for his editorial entitled "How to Reform State
Colleges." 66

Boverini then told the Commission that the

message of House 6200 was "to expedite", and the Chairman
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said that "nothing is final."

He also said "I would never

Chairman of a moot Commission."
Boverini stated that after this meeting,
it will be up
to the Commission members themselves
and the staff to sit
down and stop listening and start doing
some talking.
He
felt sure that when the Governor comes
he would reinforce
those feelings.
He told the Commission that although
he

decried the process of using the budget to implement
reorganization, the whole budget process could be completed
within
five weeks, so that something

(perhaps an interim report)

has got to be produced by this Commission.

John Olver urged input from the Commission prior to

budget approval.

George Hazzard questioned if the Commis-

sion members could, in fact, agree on general principles.
Dr.

Singer suggested that an incomplete plan would be better

than none.
At this point the discussion seemed to be heading in
a

direction which could lead to a partial or interim report.

Arnold Friedman, however, was staunchly opposed to any plan
that might be considered to be poorly conceived, or that

would have to circumvent the public hearing process in order
to gain implementation.

He stated that he would rather have

House 6200 than to be forced to submit a poor proposal.

Chairman Boverini suggested using the Boston subgroup
recommendation, stonewalling, and standing solidly behind
the Boston proposal.

He said that the Commission would win.
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Before turning the chair over to
Dr. Sherry, Boverini said
to continue as though nothing
happened— the Governor will
probably tell you the sane thing on
May 8th. He also said
that "I might get the Speaker and
the President to come
down and speak also before our group."
The advice to continue as though nothing had happened
was bad advice if the
Commission was to make any real progress.
its present
course, if continued unchanged, did not
guarantee success.
The assertion that the Speaker and President
might accompany
the Chairman was, infortunately

,

made without prior assur-

ances from the parties referred to.
Dr.

Sherry, upon assuming the chair, directed the

attention of the Governance subgroup members to the first
item on the agenda, a review of House 6200.

This suggestion

met with immediate opposition from several members.

Repre-

sentative Iris Holland railed against the Governor's libbying for the budget.

Arnold Friedman, enjoying one of his

most forceful meetings said, "I say to Hell with it (House
Bill 6200) at this point."

He also said the only way that

he would consider a Finnegan plan would be if Finnegan sub-

mitted his plan to the Commission and not to the Ways and
Means Committee.

With fighting words, Robert Spiller echoed Mr.

Friedman's feeling, and introduced a few of his own.

He

ended his remarks with, "We either have a Commission or we
do not have a Commission."
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Needless to

say— Review

of H6200 was not considered.

The next section of the meeting was
devoted to discussions pertaining to collective bargaining,
salaries, and job
descriptions. The discussion, and presentation
of material,

was slow and cumbersome, and an observer could
only feel
that it might be more prudent for the Commission
to move a

little faster.

Secretary Johnson did bring out one inter-

esting point prior to the end of the discussion in relation
to the subject of collective bargaining.

He stated that all

plans and all preliminary bargaining are moot if an under-

standing is not available with the executive branch.

After the discussion of collective bargaining procedure,
a recess was taken.

When the meeting was recalled to order.

President John Buckley presented

a

plan of reorganization de-

veloped by the Board of Regional Community Colleges.

He

also suggested that the Commission do something as quickly
as possible.

He warned that if the Commission does not re-

spond in some way before the Senate acts upon the budget,
this Commission is apt to be irrelevant.
also issued a warning during this meeting

(Secretary Johnson

— The

Commission

has to interact with the Senate and House.)
A short time later during the meeting, the talk swung
to how the Governance subgroup would conduct its next

meetings.

This discussion used up between ten and fifteen

minutes, and was completely unnecessary.

It remains a

complete mystery to me how Commission members could have
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allowed themselves to flounder aimlessly
when it was so
cr ^^-*- ca ^ f° r them to do something
positive.
Finally, the meeting began to degenerate
at the end.
Members became boisterous, and no firm control
was exhibited
from the chair.
Somehow, amid all the growing din, several

things were resolved as items for the future:
1.

A plan would be developed for Boston.

2.

A plan would be developed showing strong central-

ization, and then a plan would be developed showing

effects of decentralization.
3.

Union representatives and students would be issued

invitations to appear before the Governance subgroup.
4.

The staff would work on plans.

Now let us move on to a consideration of the three
Boston subgroup meetings of April 17, May

1

and May 6, 1980.

In contrast to the prevailing indecisive approval to problem

solving exhibited by the Governance subgroup at its April
24,

1980 meeting, the Boston subgroup spent three meetings

solidifying its data bank relative to the services and

opportunities offered (and needed to be offered) by the six
Boston institutions of public higher education.

Students,

faculty and staff again took part in the discussions with
the Boston subgroup, and the subgroup got closer to the

point of issuing its preliminary report.
The May

6,

Boston subgroup.

1980 meeting was the eighth meeting of the

There would be five more.
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(The Commission received a
message from the Board of

Trustees of Southeastern Massachusetts
University which was
dated (lay 6, 1980 and which strongly
lobbied against one
central board which would govern all
of public higher education in Massachusetts.)

May

8

,

The Governor arrived at the full
Commission meeting of
1980 alone.
Senator Boverini's hope that the

Governor would be accompanied by the Speaker
and the Senate
President was unfounded.
His message was clear.
the Commission

,

Although he still supported

he regarded the House action as "a pretty

decent stimulus."

The Governor did not appear to be at ease

in the Commission chambers at any time during
the meeting.
I

had the distinct impression while watching the Governor
in

action, that he was secretly delighted at the action the

House had taken, and was looking forward to a possible re-

duction in state spending if the Commission failed to come
up with a planned alternative to House 6200.

It was apparent

that the Commission, especially the gubernatorial appointees,

expected some heartwarming or buoyant message from Governor
King.

thing

There was none.

— or

The message was very clear.

Do some-

else.

Chairman Boverini had stated when the Governor first

arrived that the Governor would answer no questions.

No one

on the Commission tried to challenge that blockade so the

only thing the Commission received was a prepared statement.
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The Governor did state that he was
not even generally
aware of the action of the House. However,
he agreed with
and supported the thrust of the House
action.

King urged the Commission to forward what
they had,

even if it was incomplete.

He definitely implied that he

wanted some significant action before the end of
this legislative year.
The Governor's appearance was brief, and it was an

embarrassment to the Commission members on two counts.
1.

No questions were allowed.

2.

The Governor offered a devastating blow to many

members of the Commission by openly endorsing the
action of the House of Representatives.
(Even more devastating, at least to this observer,

was the attitude of some Commission members who indicated
by their words or actions that they not only expected the

action of the House but gave it a covert endorsement.)
Before the Governor arrived at the meeting, most of
the dialogue of the Commission had been directed at focusing on the issue of some sort of positive action, while

some of the dialogue had been reserved for speaking in an

angry fashion about the action of the House in passing
House 6200.

Representative Matrango stated that he apolo-

gized to the Commission members for the fact that he and
the other members of the legislature were unable to strike
the outside reorganization language from the budget, but
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does not have to apologize for the manner
in which the
House/Commission members conducted themselves.
"We fought
the good fight." He implied that the battle
might have
been lost, but the war was far from over.

Representative Corazzini wanted the Commission to

know that there was no personal vendetta by the Ways
and
Means Committee, and the House was only interested in
causing
the Commission to move faster.

although

a

(Representative Corazzini,

member of the Commission, had not supported his

Commission colleagues in a crucial vote on the House floor
during passage of the budget.)

Matrango's reply to Representative Corazzini was
correct and cutting.

He coldly informed the Representative

that what he had just informed the Commission about might

very well be completely wrong should the Senate adopt the
same outside language as the House.

After the Governor left the May

8,

1980 meeting, a

great deal of dialogue took place. Secretary Johnson urged
that the Commission trust the Governor, and Arnold Friedman

urged that a massive effort to produce

a

reasonable plan in

a short time be considered by the Commission.

stated,

"This Commission needs to provide leadership."

in strong language.

delay as

Laura Clausen

a

And,

Representative Collins openly alluded to

pertinent factor to be dealt with, both as

a

symbol of the slow pace of the Commission up to the current
point, and as something to be avoided in all future work of
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the Commission.

Finally, on a motion of Arnold
Friedman (supported by
a 10 to 5 vote)
the Commission decided to meet
in marathon
session the following weekend.
,

The Commission members had boldly
spurned the idea of
discussing the ramifications of House 6200
at their April
24, 1980 Governance meeting.
However, discussed or not,
that document provided the stimulus for
this Commission to

stop its procrastinating and agree to
channel its energies
into a marathon weekend session.
Despite the angry railing
of the Commission members at the Governor's
failure to act

quickly on the appointment of members to the Commission
and
the angry comments directed at the members of the
House Ways

and Means Committee, the fact remained that all of the

Commission's work and data compilation suddenly was coming
up short, and something drastic was going to have to be done.

May

8,

1980 marked a sad day for the Commission

— the

Governor paid a contemptuous and brief visit; one of their
own members had deserted their ranks in a House vote; and
the Commission had nothing ready to produce for the Senate

Ways and Means Committee.

The most cruel blow was the con-

tinued lack of leadership on the part of those who should
have been giving leadership.

The future did not look good.

However, a chance remained, albeit a long one.

Oddly enough, the Honorable John Collins and Dr.
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George Ilazzard were both absent from
this meeting.
Yet,
only a week later, their input would shape
the future of
higher education in Massachusetts
Just before the May

mission, a May

5,

3,

1900 meeting of the full Com-

1930 Boston Globe article cited the major

points of the reorganization plan of State Secretary
of

Education Charles

E.

M.

Johnson.
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The plan was vastly different from, and in many in-

stances directly opposite to, the plan of John Finnegan and
the House Ways and Means Committee.
It was an interesting decision making puzzle for the

Governor— whether to consider the proposal put forth by his
appointee, or whether to continue to (allegedly) support the

effort of the legislature.
Time Span III

This section will deal with the Governance subgroup
of May 13, 1980 and the Boston subgroup of May 15, 1980.
As agreed to in the April 24, 1980 meeting, arrange-

ments were made to allow spokespersons of bargaining units
and students to appear at the May 13, 1980 meeting.

(Scheduled to meet in marathon session on the 16th
of May, the Commission was in the position of still being

without a definite plan or proposal while it sat through
the testimony of various people.)
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Representatives of the Massachusetts
Teachers Association and the American Federation of
Teachers

(SMU Division)

spoke before the Commission.

Also, several students spoke

before the Commission, urging among other
things student
retention on governing and advisory boards, a
better articulation policy and flexible programming.

After the presentations, the Commission's Governance
subgroup got down to business, and much discussion took
place on proposed governance structures.

Representative

James Collins found himself on the firing line because he

suggested that his proposal for

a

possible governance

structure be moved by the Commission for discussion.

Mayor

John Collins directed some strong doubts on discussing the

proposal at Representative Collins, as did Commission member
Spiller
The meeting continued with some semblance of continuity
and agreement marking the last portion of the meeting.
1.

It was agreed by consensus that there should be

twenty-one members on the proposed board, and that the
board should approve missions of institutions.
2.

It was agreed by the body that no segmental

membership should occur on the board (central)
3.

There was consensus that a nominating commission

should be formed, and the maker, Iris Holland, presented the Commission with a detailed set of guidelines for such a commission.
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4.

The majority of the Commission
gave consensus to

Representative Collins's motion. 68
5.

It was agreed that the proposed board
have the

authority to terminate programs in the public
sector.
Finally, it was agreed to individually review
the

various proposals discussed during this meeting at
the
k e<?inning of Friday's marathon session.

The Boston subgroup met on Thursday, May 15, 1980,
183 days beyond the first meeting of the Commission.

Un-

known to the members, the full activity of the majority of
the Commission members would cease within thirty days.
It also marked the first official day that House 6200,

with its outside language on reorganization, was in the hands
of the Senate, in the form of Senate 2200.

6°

The main thrust of the Boston subgroup had been to

study the Boston schools as a separate entity.

That thrust

had been pursued in a diligent manner.

Senator D'/imico read to the subgroup the summary of
the recommendations of the Commission staff, and the input of

faculty, students and college constituencies, and the Com-

mission itself.

The amazing thing is that much of the input

from faculty and staff and student bodies dwelled upon the

absolute need to retain the individual campuses within the
current configuration, and thus was in direct opposition to
the recommendations offered in the form of a working paper

by the Boston subgroup and its staff.
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The recommendations of the
Boston subgroup presented
by Senator D'Amico included
placing all four-year and postfour-year programs currently in
Boston under one University
structure, putting all community
colleges within the Boston
area under one structure (and
adding a fourth unit to that
consortium, the Community College
Without Walls), and founding a core city consortium.
In addition the package summarized by Senator D'Amico called for
the establishment of a
task force to draw plans to effect
these suggested changes
and mergers, and a timetable.

Representative Polaski expressed a need to
take a
strong look at these recommendations before
any votes were
taken.

The response by Senator D'Amico was that all
members

have known about these recommendations, and that
he would

honor a legitimate request for thorough perusal, if a
timetable would be followed.
(This meeting was open for discussion only to the sub-

group members.)
Most of the subgroup used the discussion period to

protest the thrust of the recommendations rather than to
support their thrust.

Janet Robinson pleaded for better

statistics before she wished to vote on the proposed merger
of UMass/Boston
of Art.

,

Boston State and the Massachusetts College

Representative King wanted to know if these propos-

als reflected actual student needs or if they represented,
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instead

pressure group that wants to cut
costs.
Senator D'Amico stressed the need
for realization
that the recommendations before the
subgroup have been
placed there by unbiased groups, and that
even though
mergers are mentioned in the recommendation,
a

,

it is not in-

tended to simply evacuate all current sites.
Senator D'Amico strongly stated the case
for all due
speed to be followed in a decision by the
Commission, but
he warned that "There are other elements
out there."

He

stressed that the House and Senate Chairman of
the Ways and
Means Committee believe in contraction of the institutions
at the baccalaureate level.

Secretary Johnson commended Senator D'Amico, and entreated the efforts of all members to try to understand the
Senator

s

commitment.

He also made a valuable contribution

to the tone of this meeting by seeking an address of the

issues one step at a time.
The meeting became a contest between Senator D'Amico
and the membership.

The contest revolved around the issue

of action in this meeting or the issue of no action in this

meeting
Slowly the impasse began to erode.
Finally, the ice was broken.

The motion was made by

Representative King to vote on the development of
city consortium.

opposition

a

core

The motion passed, despite some stated
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Other motions followed dealing with proper
facilities
for Roxbury Community College and others
establishing a

temporary facility for the Board of Community
Colleges, and
a location of Massachusetts College of
Art in an urban
center
The meeting adjourned some three hours after it

started.

Consensus had been reached on some points of the
Boston report, but only after practically

a

physical assault

on the subgroup members by the Chairman.

The next day saw the heralded marathon session

scheduled.

If the Boston subgroup meeting of May 15 was any

indicator, the session would prove to be very interesting,
indeed.

Representative Collins had made

successfully voted by his colleagues.

a

motion

70

which was

It remained to be

seen whether the motion, calling for due process relative
to the Commission's report, meant anything of importance to

the Commission.

CHAPTER

VI

MARATHON SESSION
May, 1980 was a very important month
for the Special

Commission.

The meeting of May 8, 1980 was the
date of a

visit from the Governor.

May 15, 1980 saw the budget come

out of the Senate Ways and Means Committee
without any outside language on reorganization.
May 16 and
17,

1980 saw

marathon session of the Special Commission take
place,
and the Senate and House budgets were sent to a
conference
a

committee in early June after the House in late May refused
to concur with the Senate budget presentation.

This chapter will record the details of the marathon

session of May 16 and 17, 1980.
Day

I

-

May 16, 1980

Senate and gubernatorial appointees present registered

eighty percent attendance, while the House members showed
sixty percent attending.

Gubernatorial appointee Howell

still had not come to a meeting, and this day was no ex-

ception.

The meeting was the first official one for Judge

John Fox, and served as the last official one for Dr. Singer,

Senator Buell, and Representative Cimino.

(May 8,

1980 had

been the last day of attendance for Senator Fonseca.)
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The meeting opened with reports
from Dr. Sherry and
Senator D'Amico. An agenda had
been prepared, but some
confusion arose early in the meeting
relative to what
specific course to follow (whether
to stay as a full Commission, break into subcommittees, or
take some other course)

Arnold Friedman suggested that the members
stay as a committee of the whole, and take input from
all members.
In spite
of that, shortly afterward. Representative
Collins (at 10:55
a.m.) moved that the full Commission
participate in a Governance subgroup meeting.
It was not formally voted,
but took

place anyway.

Representative Collins directed Janet Slovin to lead
the discussion on the governance issue.

Perhaps because of

the heightened sense of pressure from outside, the first

part of the presentation dealing with the possible forms of

governance started off with

a

high degree of concentration.

However, that state of affairs was a momentary thing, and
soon the process, in my opinion, began to break down.
For approximately the next hour, a variety of issues

was discussed by the Commission members.

Commission member

Arnold Friedman suggested a direction to take when he
suggested that the Commission make

a

structure first, and

then assign powers within the structure.

Further direction

was suggested by Senator John Olver when he said "We are
here because of dissatisfaction with the present system.
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Put as much governance as possible at
the campus level."

Representative Collins urged his colleagues
to consider the establishment of a central board
with powers

of

budget

program and plant, and the power of being
the exclusive voice of public higher education before
the
,

legis-

lature and the governor.

Then Representative Collins

suggested that the segmental boards be given powers by
this
central board so that they can function easily on a
local
level with central board direction.

That brought about an interesting contest.

For the

few minutes, it was Collins vs Collins, as the former

Mayor fought the idea of Representative Collins's motion
being placed before the group for discussion purposes.

In-

stead, the former Mayor suggested that several options be

considered.

Finally, Representative Iris Holland cleared

the impasse by making a motion that the plan of Representa-

tive Collins be used as a model for discussion.

The motion

was approved, and the meeting progressed.

Representative Collins took the opportunity to immediately launch into

a

discussion of how the budgets for the

institutions will be formulated, and again discussed the
function of a central board, and then the role of segmental
boards.

(Senator John Olver then questioned the need for

segmental boards at all.)

Much discussion again took place about the need for
segments, with Representative Collins putting the case for
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segmental boards as strongly as
he could.
He cautioned the
Commission that a complete lack of
segmental boards would
force all decisions to be made
at the top, with no input
from institutions.
(it was obvious that most
members of
the Commission were reluctant to
agree, especially quickly,
with Representative Collins, but
found no effective way to
either stifle the Representative or
openly fight with him.
Instead many Commission members simply
used the method of
raising small issues that were effective
blockers even
though none were substantive issues.)
Finally, the topic shifted to another area
and allocations.

— budgets

Extensive debate occurred about the

functions of a central board in relation to the
budget pro
cess, to whom the central board would recommend
its budget

proposals, and what the merits of the joint legislative

Education Committee's input into the process of central
board budget proposals would be.
Laura Clausen openly scoffed at any talk of really

changing the allocation process, and referred to the many
friends in the legislature that the colleges have.

Other

comments on budgets were advanced by Commissioner Anrig and

Secretary Johnson.
After a relatively unprogressive morning, activities
stopped while the Commission members broke for lunch.

When the Commission convened again, the first move
was to postpone action on any Boston issue until Monday,

00

May 19, 1980.

While within this stance of
changing gears,
Chairraan Boverini than took the
opportunity to tell
the

Commission that if this Commission
would do something to
produce a piece of legislation, the
legislative process
could be followed, and he ventured

that even those who have

already proposed a legislative package
of reorganization
would be desirous of seeing something
positive emanate from
the Commission.
(His statement that even those
who have

already proposed a legislative package of
reorganization
would be pleased to see something come out of
the Commission
could not have been made with the slightest bit
of certainty
on his part.

I

feel that it was a statement to justify the

direction that the Commission was taking by holding the

marathon session in the first place.)
Senator Olver offered the thought that the Housesenate Conference Committee could be through with its work in

early June.

This caused Chairman Boverini to state that in

the event legislation was agreed upon by the House and Senate

Conference Committee, the Commission could still file

a

plan

with the Governor, and the Commission's plan could end up in
the outside language of the budget.
a

This suggested mode was

radical departure for Chairman Boverini to take, because

up to this point, the only course that he had advised and

advocated was one that involved the legislative process.
The chairman then urged faster progress (which was also a

radical departure for him)
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The next action occurred very
quietly, but was one of
the most significant milestones of
the Commission.
The

Honorable John Collins proposed a 15-member
Public/Independent Coordinating Commission which would
have broad powers,
and the proposal made no arrangements for
segmental boards.
He wished this board to be examined along
with the proposal

of Representative Collins.

The proposal was made without

fanfare or loud noises, but was to provide the
substance of
an actual reorganization move that became reality.

Secretary Johnson diverted the Commission for

a short

while by attempting to have the Commission look at the role
of the Executive Office of Education.

Executive Director

Richard Hailer probably offered the most concise statements
of his term by stating that the vital link missing in the

Secretary's office was power.

Without power, it was in-

ferred, all discussion of the Secretary's office was pointless, and should not be pursued.

The meeting continued, this time with a discussion of

collective bargaining and its implementation.

Basically,

one of the main issues was that of deciding where the best

place was to deal with personnel, collective bargaining and

other important issues.

In other words, who is the employer

Representative Collins pushed diligently for the inclu
sion of the segmental boards within the governance structure
Dr.

Sherry stated that he felt

a

consensus approved the

strong central board concept, but he felt from what was said
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that segmental boards were necessary.

Both Dr. Sherry and

Representative Collins tried to set the stage
to elicit a
consensus vote from the Commission members.
Representative Mullins moved to continue discussion
of the concept of a Board of Governors, but
was driven to

intense anger when the subject of institutional
autonomy
arose.

Representative Mullins jumped in angrily to say

that the whole question of institutional autonomy was

thrown into a cocked hat three or four years ago when the

legislature appropriated money for institutions to hire
faculty members and the money was used for administrators
instead.

That, he said was the crux of the situation today

that found the legislature unwilling to let the colleges
and universities have true fiscal autonomy.

Although it

was not noted in the official minutes, the motion to con-

tinue discussion of the Board of Governors passed.

Almost immediately afterward, Representative Holland

offered a motion to have the Board of Governors set tuition
policy and that the fees should be established by segments
(or individual institutions).

However, the motion was with-

drawn momentarily by consensus.

Chancellor Clausen initiated, with the help of Representative Collins,

a

discussion of programmatic issues.

While the Commission members started to coordinate their
thoughts on this issue Representative Holland called for
vote on her previous motion regarding tuition policy.

a
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Thie

motion was declared approved by Chairman Boverini,

and the discussion on programmatic issues resumed.
Dr.

Sherry

,

who was having one of his most visible

(and audible) meetings this day again tried to establish

consensus among the members regarding programmatic issues

within public institutions as might be ordained by the 3oard
of Governors.

Representative Collins again came to the rescue by

proposing a motion as follows:

"The Board of Governors

shall assume present Board of Higher Education authority to

review and approve programs and degrees for public and
private institutions.

Further, the Board of Governors shall

have the authority to rescind programs and degrees for public

institutions by a two-thirds vote.

Further, the Board of

Governor's programmatic guidelines for public institutions,
including approval/disapproval of missions and preparation
of a master plan, shall be those outlined in Chancellor

Clausen's working paper presented to the Commission; with the

exception that segmental missions shall replace institutional

missions if segmental structure is retained.

Definition of

program shall be as presently defined by the Board of Higher
Education."
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The motion was approved.

After the motion was passed, Dr. Sherry proposed
that because of the shortened time line the Governance sub-

group would work through the night and the first part of
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the day tomorrow, and then present a consensus to the full

Commission on the afternoon of May 17.

Commissioner Anriq

and Senator D'Amico both supported Dr. Sherry's proposal.
The thought was formed into a motion, and approval was voted.

The full Commission stood adjourned.

After the Governance subgroup reconvened, many topics

were brought on the table, including affirmative action,

personnel policies, planning, and scholarships".
The following actions are worthy of record.

Representative Collins, indef atigably

,

pursued the

idea of segmental authority to be formed as well as

central Board of Governors.

a

He asked for the consensus of

the Commission's Governance subgroup relative to whether or

not to favor the general concept of supporting the idea of

segmental authority.

Chancellor Clausen raised the question of possibly
doing away with the idea of segments entirely.

But, Commis-

sioner Anrig suggested that segments were absolutely necessary because of the fact that there are thirty institutions,
and one board could not do the job.

Senator Olver wondered

about the number of segments that would be needed, and on a

practical basis said that the number is not as important as
the concept of endorsing segmental boards.

opted for segmental level governance, also.

Arnold Friedman
He agreed with

Representative
the form of segmental governance suggested by
community
Collins (universities and state colleges together,
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colleges separate)

Representative Collins took advantage of
the cresting
feeling for segmental governance which
appeared to be occurring by reaffirming the logic of the
inclusion of segmental
governance.
Dr. Sherry came very close to getting
a consensus regarding segments immediately after the
remarks of

Secretary Johnson, but Dr. Kailer wanted to say
first.

a

few words

This came very close to being a nearly fatal mistake,

and was certainly poor procedure.
Dr.

nailer's remarks included glowing praise of Rep-

resentative James Collins for all the hard work that he had
done

Approximately nine minutes after Dr. Sherry first
called for a consensus on segments, he called for one again.
He again missed the opportunity, this time giving the floor
to Senator Olver.

Several minutes later, Arnold Friedman said, "Move the

question."

Representative Collins then got up and clarified

his motion once again.

Finally

,

the question was moved (after another sixty

seconds of clarification) and it was approved unanimously.
The next question dealt with advisory boards, and the

qualifications of members of same.

Dr.

Sherry put forward

his recommendations relative to advisory boards, and the

specific recommendations were then discussed.

Senator Olver

offered advice to have more than one alumni representative
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on the advisory board, and Secretary
Johnson concurred.
The Commission unanimously approved
the concept of advisory
boards for those institutions which did
not have a board of
trustees on campus. Specific determination of
advisory

board makeup would be determined at

a later date.

After a very short break, a very touchy subject
was
discussed by the Governance subgroup. This subject was
the

function of the Office of the Executive Secretary of Education.

Many oblique references had been made to the Office

of Secretary of Education throughout the past several months.
Now, the mechanism of the Governance subgroup would allow a

close inspection of that system.

Secretary Johnson used the

opportunity to point out the various functions of the
Secretary's office.

The Secretary also pointed out that the

function of the Secretary has changed since inception, and
these changes have resulted in a stronger and more modern

structure of services.

Commissioner Anrig speculated that there will always
be an Executive Office of Educational Affairs whether this

Commission deems it so or not.

This statement led Dr.

Sherry to shift the direction of the Governance subgroup
from a consideration of the function of the Secretary in

general to, instead, a consideration of the role of the

Secretary with the proposed Board of Governors.

Further,

the next question was that of whether the Governor (or

specific designee) should sit on the proposed Board of
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Governors
If the Secretary had any fears of what the Governance

subgroup felt about the future of the office of the
Secretary, they were allayed by the discussion and expressions of consensus relative to his position on the evening
of Hay 16, 1980

(even though other quarters were not as

charitable)

Representative Collins suggested that the proposed
Board of Governors be the sole authority on budget and programs dealing with the legislature and governor, and to that
end proposed a recommendation to separate the Secretary of

Education from any line authority of budgetary or programmatic dealings.

At the same time. Representative Collins

made a niche for the Secretary in relation to any future

nominating committee that might be formulated to screen
potential members of advisory boards and boards of trustees.
The motion was seconded (by the Secretary of Education) and

then passed.

Consensus was then reached (unanimously) that

the Governor or the Secretary of Education would sit on the

Board of Governors.
Several other points were discussed throughout the

remainder of the evening, commencing with
enrollment.

a

discussion of

However, no action was taken on the subject

how enrollbecause of the lack of a specific direction on
Instead, the concept of enrollment
ment should be treated.
of lona-ranae
was allowed to be included in the subject
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planning.

Two additional items, one
dealing with budget

and the other with collective
bargaining, were put forth by

Representative Collins but the only concrete
action taken
was an agreement by the few remaining
Commission members
(regular and ex officio) to discuss them
on the morning of
May 17th. Adjournment was voted.
The first of two days of marathon session
had ended.

Former Mayor John Collins only attended one of
the two
sessions, and Dr. George Hazzard would attend
neither.

How-

ever, the Collins-Hazzard proposal, that would
emanate from

this Commission as a minority report, possessed the
potential
for massive impact on public higher education.

Day II

-

May 17, 1980

The meeting of the Governance subgroup resumed.

Rep-

resentative Collins summarized the work of the Governance
subgroup to date, and repeated all recommendations relative
to that work.

nors

He stated that the proposed Board of Gover-

(referred to by the author at various times in this

dissertation as BOG, also) would essentially have the power
of the present Board of Higher Education.

The proposed

structure follows.
1.

Twenty-one member board (at large)

2.

Five-year terms

3.

Appointments made through

a

nominating commission.
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4.

BOG would have internal fiscal
autonomy.

5.

BOG would have final authority on
budget prior
to presentation to legislature and
governor.

6.

BOG would have programmatic powers.

7.

BOG would have planning responsibility.

8.

BOG would have authority to develop an
information
system.

9.

10.

BOG would set tuition.
BOG will give final approval to capital outlay

recommendations
11.

BOG would arrange for coordination of financial
aid guidelines.

12.

BOG would have the authority to form and imple-

ment policy regarding affirmative action.
13.

BOG would oversee segmental boards.

14.

Segmental Boards would have specific powers.
(The full text of the Governance subgroup

working paper will be found in Appendix F.)
The various portions of the Governance subgroup working paper were discussed, refined and voted upon.

Details

were interjected for discussion, sometimes approved and
sometimes disapproved or withdrawn.
The subject of budget was discussed, with the central

theme dealing with the Board of Governors receiving suffi-

cient power so that in case an individual segment or insti-

tution attempted to circumvent the Board of Governors by
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going directly to the legislature
(or specific members of
the legislature) for increased
appropriations, disciplinary
force could be exerted by the BOG on
that institution
or

segment.

(It was a point well taken, because
business in

Massachusetts between public higher education
and the legislature has been by history overt and covert,
with a great
deal of the latter taking place.)
A very worthy idea was advanced by Robert
Spiller,

Commission member, who advocated the use of tuition
funds
by the institutions which received them, instead
of sending

them back to the state.

Fellow commissioners Holland and

Anrig concurred with Mr. Spiller, but the matter was never
refined in this meeting in a manner which allowed resolution.
Unfortunately, it was referred to the proposed Board of

Governors for their study.

Arnold Friedman also made a valuable attempt to clarify
a loosely coordinated part of current higher education when

he attempted to have the Commission resolve the issue of

building authorities.

He wanted to know why joint efforts

couldn't be combined into

a

single authority.

It was

suggested that any such coordination wait for the results of
the Special Ward Commission now investigating construction

practices in the Commonwealth.
The mission of colleges and universities was dis-

cussed, with consensus reached by the Commission that the

Board of Governors would determine the mission of the seg-
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ments and the institutions within the
segments, and the
segments would determine the admissions
policies

for the

institutions under its control.
Finally, after two days of discussion, Representative

James Collins moved that the Governance report be
forwarded
to the full Commission.

The motion passed.

Senator Walter Boverini assumed the chair, and presided over the quickest action of the day.
Dr.

Sherry proposed that the Commission accept and

adopt the report of the Governance subgroup, and

a poll of

the membership was the basis of a motion by Representative

Menard.

Both passed, and the meeting was adjourned.

The long

weekend was over.
The Sunday Republican of May 18, 1980 reported the

outcome of the meeting in detail, and the headline said
"College Plan Drafted."

The newspaper account made it seem

as though this plan would probably become the final one.
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The end result looked impressive, but was far from

complete.

I

fully agreed with the need for a strong central

board, and felt that the action recommending a twenty-one

member Board of Governors (with no segmental representation
after a transition period) was excellent.

But, no definite

plan dealing directly with the issue of segmental governance
was addressed.
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A review of the action taken by
the Commission reveals
the following points.

The proposed legislative package
was broad, but
failed to adequately address the issues
of segmental
1.

board governance and tuition payment
recognition to
c -*-P a : ing public colleges and
P ar
universities.

^

2.

'*

The package made reference to routes of
communi-

cation between the Board of Governors and
segments,
and between segments and individual institutions,

without really establishing a structure to make sure
that communication took place.
3.

Provisions were made to allow for a five-year

master plan, with no provision made that ensured its
formulation
4

.

A great deal of the package put together by the

Governance subgroup was formed with the direct help
of Commissioner Anrig, Chancellor Clausen and

Secretary Johnson (ex officio members of the Commission)

.

Certainly, the input of the three professionals

was interesting and informative.

However, the poten-

tial elimination of two of the above positions brings

me to the opinion that the ex officio members should
have been used as consultants rather than direct

participants
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5.

The entire package was put together in
a partial

vacuum because the legislative members of the
Great
and General Court, with the exception of
the Commis-

sion members, had given it no promise of support.
The House and Senate leadership was never overtly

contacted in reference to its potential approval of
the proposed legislative package.
6.

No attempt was made to seek the support of the

educational community in a giant effort to get the

measure approved.
7.

Finally, the package was put together so hurried-

ly, and without all Commission members present at the

final marathon meeting, that the Commission members

themselves did not have ample time to understand it
or to fully extend their support for it.

The final Governance meeting of the Commission's term

had closed, and had produced an avalanche of suggested

structure whose value would be determined within

a

couple of

weeks
In the next chapter,

I

shall address the output of the

Boston subgroup as well as the final full meeting of the
Special Commission.

CHAPTER

VII

THE FINAL STROKE

The Special Commission on reorganization only
had a

few short days of existence left as of May 19, 1980.

Its

effective life would end on June 11, some twenty-four days
later.

A very slow start had handicapped the Commission

because outside forces had moved quickly to establish a

massive strike force, and these forces had maneuvered the
Commission into a retaliatory pattern of action to produce
legislation which was hastily conceived, hurriedly activated, and imploringly dispatched to the legislature.

Com-

mission Chairman Walter Boverini had also filed the minority
report sponsored by Dr. George Hazzard and the Honorable
John Collins.
The thrust of the minority report called for a fifteen-

member central board, allowed for no segmental boards,

established boards of trustees at each individual institution and provided those boards with strong powers, abolished both the Office of Secretary of Education and the

Board of Higher Education and gave the central board strong
and specific powers.
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Finishing Touches
Thus, on May 19, 1930, the fourth-f
rom-the-last Boston

subgroup meeting was held in an aura of tension.
The atmosphere was a charged one in a general
sense.
The final Commonwealth budget for FY '82, along
with any

outside language, was going to be reviewed and decided
upon
by a Conference Committee of House and Senate members;
the

Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee still held
to most of his original thoughts on reorganization of
higher

education; the Governor had for all practical purposes denied
his support to the Commission; and a proposal for governance

had been produced by the Commission, but no one on the Com-

mission could be certain that the proposal would turn out to
be anything but a paper exercise.

The May 19, 1980 Boston subgroup meeting would be the

first of a series of meetings of that body to be held in May
and June.

3ecause of outside pressures, the Boston subgroup

found itself racing to finish its deliberations.
The reader will recall that in Chapter IV of this

work

I

highlighted the prediction of Foster Furcolo that the

Commission may never get around to making final recommendations.

Also, the reader will remember several instances

where the Commission was urged to hurry along.

Nov; it

was

critical for the Boston subgroup to move quickly and

effectively, and it was doubtful if that objective could be
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reached.
The Chairman, Senator D'Amico, opened the
May 19, 1980

Boston subgroup meeting with a review of the
previous

meeting's action.

His next action was to ask the Boston

subgroup to consider approval of a motion which would offer

protection to any administrator, faculty and professional
and nonprofessional staff at Boston State College who might
be transferred as a result of incorporation to a different

operating authority because of action recommended by the
Commission or any subgroup of the Commission.
The motion was not given quick approval, by any means.

One complicating factor was the interruption of proceedings
by a House roll call, so that the pending vote required the

return of the temporarily absent House members.

Another

factor was the very real opposition and/or stubborn re-

sistance on the part of the Commission members to any quick

acceptance of Senator D'Amico's motion as it was presented.
To be specific, Representatives Pokaski and King and Chan-

cellor Hammond were less than happy with Senator D'Amico's
proposal.

Their basic unhappiness seemed to stem from a

perception that UMass/Boston had not fulfilled its potential
for people in comparison to Boston State College, and there-

fore Boston State should not be placed under UMass/Boston.
In the face of explicit criticism of his motion

Senator D'Amico momentarily dropped his pleasant manner,
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and stated that all data being discussed
had been around for
quite a while, and he implied that criticism was
uncalled
for now.

He stated, with the help of Dr. Mailer, that
all

reasoning was based on demographics and not upon emotions,
and categorized his ideas as being ideas on middle ground.

(Interestingly, he rather testily told the members of the

subgroup that if he had wanted to rush this issue of incor'P ->I a ‘tion through, he would have held a marathon session
'

<

over the past weekend, but he did not do so because he

thought that that "would have been wrong... very wrong."

In

light of the May 16 and 17 marathon just completed, with
its resulting legislative proposals, Senator D'Amico's re-

marks were extremely interesting

.

Representative Pokaski proved to be vociferous on the
subject of the proposed incorporation.

His main argument

was that the incorporation would/could lead to a disjunction
of the learning process on the part of students affected by
the proposed incorporation.

He stated that his only purpose

in offering resistance was to try to ensure protection for

the proposed clients.

(This was really the first visible

and audible major input of Representative Pokaski all year.)
A second roll call in the House Chambers caused another

delay in the Boston subgroup proceedings.

Senator D'Amico

used the intermission to state that there was no way that
all students now at Boston State could fit at UMass/Boston

even though Chairman Finnegan and Chairman Atkins appeared
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to think that it can be done.

He also stated that he felt

the Boston subgroup was not ready
to address the issue of
actual incorporation or merger.

A great deal of the discussion
centered around the
proposed name of the potential college/university
in a
.

move to compromise

,

Senator D'Amico suggested that the name

Boston State be removed from his motion and
instead the
mantle of intended protection should be extended
to all

four-year Boston public institutions and their
administrators, faculty and professional/nonprofessional
employees.
He strongly emphasized that his revised motion only
pro-

tected all employees in the event of incorporation, and in
no way even suggested a possible governance structure
within

Boston

After more discussion, some objective and some subjective, and almost ninety minutes after the motion was first

presented to the assemblage, the Honorable John Fox and
Representative Murray prompted, through adroit statements,
the immediate consideration of the question.

(Another of the causes of the slow progress on Senator

D'Amico's motion was the inability of anyone present to

quickly put together acceptable amendment language

,

and the

inability of anyone to respond with alacrity to the need for
the language of compromise.

Certainly, people on the staff

of the Special Commission had the experience and expertise
to work exceptionally well with language.

Obviously, their

09

talents were not called upon.)
The motion, now officially made by
Representative

Murray (as Senator D'Amico withdrew his
motion making reference to a specific motion), was approved.
It was most
interesting to watch Senator D'Amico at work.
He literally
bulled his ideas through the subgroup, and spoke
from the

chair to every motion as well.
The action of the meeting continued, with much
discussion taking place relative to meeting the needs of
students,

and the need to provide open access.

To that end,

it was

^oted that should incorporation of Boston State and UMass/

Eoston take place, these campuses shall constitute the in-

corporated institution.

After much debate on principles

governing a consolidated institution between Chancellor
Hammond and Senator D'Amico, two motions were passed which
allowed for the incorporated institution to be an educa-

tionally and administratively integrated system, and com-

mitted the incorporated institution to open access and
quality education.

The motions did much to dispel the fears

of some Commission members who hoped that any incorporation

would not lose the unique aspects of the Boston State College
campus
As the meeting adjourned, plans were affirmed to meet

the next day.

The Boston subgroup on May 20, 1930 again reviewed

plans for a possible incorporation of at least two insti-
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tutions in the Boston Area.

Senator D'Amico's efforts

were focused on location of this institution as well.

In

spite of interruptive roll calls, arguments among Commission

members and, surprisingly,

a

vote against incorporation.

Senator D Amico managed to fight his way to a decision by
the Commission in favor of incorporation of UMass/Boston

and Boston State
by itself)

.

(but to leave Massachusetts College of Art

The only part of the plan that, upon my review

of it almost one year beyond the date of that Boston subgroup

meeting, proved to be neither foresighted nor quick enough
was the provision that legislation affecting and effecting
the proposed incorporation did not have to be written until

September 30, 1980.

Sufficient time did not exist, however.

The Boston subgroup met again on Tuesday, May 27, 1980.
It was day 195 of the Commission's term.

The first action was the proposal of a motion by

Representative Pokaski which offered a suggestion that if
evidence arose to indicate that the incorporation of merger
of Boston State College and UMass/Boston was educationally

unsound or administratively not feasible, such incorporation
or merger should not take place.

The motion was approved.

It was not surprising that Representative Pokaski offered

this motion because it was evident at the May 19, 1930

Boston subgroup meeting that he was showing

a

great deal of

reservation regarding the incorporation of UMass/Boston
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and Boston State College.

(It should be noted that he is a

graduate of Boston State College.)
Next, Nancy Wylie from the Board of Regional Community

Colleges presented a mass of statistics (both in verbal form
and written form).

Ms. Wylie's report was used by the Com-

mission as an indicator of expanded community college need
in the Boston area, and as an indicator of a need for a

community college without walls.

She also mentioned coop-

erative education (as had President McKenzie of Massachusetts
Bay Community College)
point.

,

but did not stress this as her main

By comparison, with other areas, Ms. Wylie pointed

out the inadequacy of the present Boston community response
to dealing with nontraditional student needs.

After both the completion of Ms. Wylie's formal pre-

sentation and an interrupting House roll call, Senator
D'Amico expounded upon the subject of expanding the com-

munity college system within the greater Boston area.
Senator D'Amico mentioned his interest in expanding the
services, for instance, to the City of Quincy, by converting
its municipally subsidized Junior College to membership in

the community college system.

From time to time, Ms. Wylie

responded to questions from the Boston subgroup, but it was
evident that her data was compiled without an emphasis on
precision.

orated this.

Ms. Wylie's own evaluation of her data corrob-
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The last part of the meeting dealt
with a discussion
of missions of Boston community colleges,
the concept of the
College Without Walls, and a discussion of the
need to invite the Interim President and members of the
Massachusetts

Board of Community Colleges to the next meeting
of the

Boston subgroup.

A motion was made to do so, and it was

approved.
Day 202 of the Commission's term witnessed the last

meeting of the Boston subgroup.

Representatives of the

Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges were
present, including the interim president and four board

members
Chairman D'Amico greeted the five representatives of
the MBRCC, and then immediately put forth three motions

which were to provide the basis of discussion during the
meeting.
1.

The motions dealt with three specific areas:

A proposed expansion of the community college

system in Boston.
2.

The expansion shall provide general and career

programs
3.

The expansion shall be concurrent with an improved

and coordinated delivery of quality educational

services
The motions were put onto the table for discussion.

Chairman Euckley, first to speak, quickly pointed out
that the MBRCC has attempted to provide full services to
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Boston students, but a lack of funding
prevented all from
being done which needed to be done. President
Buckley
stated that the MBRCC certainly agrees with the
Commission's
aim to build a new facility for Roxbury Community
College
in the southwest corridor.

Again, he referred to the lack

of funding that has been prevalent for the last few years
i

Dr.

Muriel Camarra, a member of the Board of Trustees

and Vice-Chairman of the board, spoke on the importance of

providing career and educational services under the aegis
of the full community college, and not under the aegis of
an outreach center.

This might be a way to cut down the

presence of anything but the image of quality education.
She stressed that the community college must help to bolster

the image of those who badly need educational services as

well as provide the services.

She also spoke in support of

one Boston community college with several campuses, and

proposed only one president for the entire string of Boston
campuses
Dr.

Camarra ended her testimony by suggesting that

the Special Commission should provide extensive leadership
to the educational community within the Commonwealth.

The presence of the trustees at the meeting undoubt-

edly caused the numerous references to historical perspectives regarding the community college system.

Trustee

Robert Simha recounted failure of three gubernatorial admin-

istrations to support an in depth look at the governance
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structure of the community college; he appreciated the

attempt of this commission to elicit information regarding

governance
(The day before this meeting, a Conference Committee

formed for the purpose of ruling on the budget was appointed
from the Senate and the House.

Outside forces were closing

in, but the tone of this meeting of June 3rd was one of

historical review, and discussion of future governance
alignments.

The subject of the discussions betrayed none

of the urgency that should have been foremost upon the

knowledge of formulation of the House and Senate Conference
Committee.

This particular reaction to the impending crunch

of potential legislative dictation of reorganization, as

evinced by the testimony of the trustees present, makes one

wonder at how past issues were regarded.)
Trustee Simha made many references to the high quality
of education obtainable through the community colleges, but,
as many others had stated before him, he claimed that the

previous small resources disbursed to the community colleges
had not allowed the community college system to reach its

potential
Senator D'Amico cautioned the participating trustees
that all of this conversation could be moot if the legislature took things into its own hands.
The last part of the meeting was dedicated to

cussion of Senator D'Amico's original motions.

a

dis-

All three
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motions, after minor amendments, were moved
and voted.

The

meeting then adjourned abruptly, and all further
action was
put off until the Commission meeting of June
11,

Essentially

,

1980.

the Boston subgroup had approved in

principle the greater coordination of four-year institutions within the city of Boston, had approved the establish-

ment of a multiple campus community college system within
Boston run by a single president, maintained the unique
status of the Massachusetts College of Art, approved a new

facility for Roxbury, and had addressed several other im-

portant issues.
None of the subgroup work had been formally presented
to either the full Commission or the legislature.

A massive amount of data had been collected.

It re-

mained to be seen if anything positive would result.
The Boston subgroup had reached the identical point
in its progress that had been reached by the Governance

subgroup.

It had conducted its last meeting.

Import of Disaster

Only eight days remained until the full Commission

meeting of June 11, 1980.

But before the Commission could

meet, disaster struck.
The full import of the impending disaster first sur-

faced to the general public in a June

6,

1980 article in
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the Boston Globe 73

The article referred to Chairman of

.

the Senate Ways and Means Committee Chester Atkins
and his

remarks concerning the budget as a conduit for outside
legislation relating to reorganization.

Although previously

opposed to including the House reorganization plan in outside budget language

,

Atkins allegedly leaned toward

a re-

organization plan based on a proposal of Special Commission
members George Hazzard and John Collins.
On the same day, an article in the Springfield, Massa-

chusetts Morning Union that reported Chester Atkins had, in
fact, embraced the Collins-Hazzard model of reorganization

drew the ire of Representative James Collins, also
Commission member.

a

Special

Vowing to vote against the plan, and

stating that it would "spell the end of quality public

higher education in this state," Collins will file remedial
legislation if the plan becomes part of the fiscal year 1981
budget^ process.
.

,

74

The June ICth, 1980 edition of the Boston Globe re-

ported that the House and Senate Conference Committee of the

Massachusetts legislature had agreed to forward the reorganization package to both Houses.

75

The newspapers published in Massachusetts on June 11,
1930 told the story.

3oth branches of the legislature had

passed the budget, including the outside language forming
a strong central 3oard of Regents

forwarded to thG Governor.

,

and the budget was now

The Boston Globe editorial of
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that day stated in its headline that the higher education
bill reeked of backroom tactics. 7 6

The official roll calls of the Mouse and Senate

showed three members of the Special Commission on Reorgan-

ization voting for the reorganization package, and two members not voting.

Representatives Corazzini and Pokaski

and Senator Olver, voted for the budget, and Senator

Boverini and Representative Matrango (the latter very ill)
did not participate in the vote.

The Mouse vote for the

budget and reorganization was 102 yes, 52 no.
The Senate vote for the same was 19 yes, 15 no.

In

addition to Senator Boverini, Senate President Bulger and
Senators Amick, Bertonazzi, Lewis and Wetmore were not re-

corded as voting.
A Devastating Experience
A.bout one hundred people were in the audience ror the

Wednesday, June 11, 1980 meeting of the Special Commission
The agenda called for subcommittee reports.
given.

They were never

Instead, in an atmosphere of dejection, the possible

fate of the Commission was discussed.

Chairman Boverini rationalized his action

oj.

filing

legislature by
the majority and minority reports into the
intent to ensure
stating that he had never deviated from his
should go
that everything coining out of the Commission

ion

through the whole process of public hearings.

However, he

stunned the Commission members and spectators
present when
he said, "Lest I deceive you, I am not strongly
opposed to
any plan

that-

was accepted by the legislature.

It was akin to betrayal.

several long quiet seconds.

"

The members sat silent for

The ultimate crash had happened.

First, the Conference Committee and the legislature had

taken the reorganization process right out of the Commission's hands.

Then, three members of the Commission had

voted for the legislative reorganization proposal, and one of
the two Commission members w ho did not participate in the
T

final vote had attended the opera instead.

Nov/,

the Com-

mission members were being told that their Chairman was
really not too unhappy about the outcome.
Senator D'Amico stated that he didn't want to take
one further step until the status of the Commission was

clarified.

It was evident that the general feeling was that

until the status of the Commission was finalized, it was

foolish to continue with any future plans.

A motion was made to have the Commission members meet
with the Governor, the Speaker of the House, and the Senate
President
The members finally agreed upon the following Com-

mission representatives to meet with the three ofncials
cited above:

Chairman Walter Boverini

,

Representative James

Collins, Honorable John Fox, Arnold Friedman, Janet Robinson,
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Dr.

Francis Sherry, and Robert Spiller.
lhe major portion of the meeting was given to angry

statements as well as statements that reflected a great deal
of hurt.

Representative King said that the present adminis-

tration has a horrible record on the issue of race.

He also

felt that this Commission would be doing a disservice to

many people if it disbanded.
were,

His words to the Commission

"Don't walk away."

Senator Iris Holland bemoaned the fact that "Nobody
is listening.

Why should we work if nobody will listen?"

Representative Mullins urged the Commission not to go
in to see the Governor and legislative leadership unless

it's made clear that this Commission has been betrayed.

About an hour after it had begun, the meeting stopped,
and the Commission effectively did the same.

CHAPTER
SUMMARY:

VIII

FACT AND SPECULATION

It is very easy to pass judgment, but
indescribably

hard to justify the specific judgements made.
I

shall attempt here not to make judgments, but to

point out a great number of conditions which affected
the

outcome of the Special Commission on Reorganization.
Oj-

Some

these conditions existed at the time of the Commission's

formation, and some developed during the same time frame as
the Commi s s ion

'

s

The Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher

Education was formed under several clouds which boded ill
for its future.

The previous Special Commission (referred

to in earlier chapters)
its brief tenure.

,

had done extremely little during

Thus, the present Commission had no great

model of success to refer to, but merely an exercise on
paper to research.

The present Commission contained a member

who represented (and in fact, literally, headed) the State

College System, and also included, in ex officio status,
the Executive Secretary of Educational Affairs, the Chan-

cellor of the Board of Higher Education, and the Commissioner
of Education.

All four persons certainly had specific con-

stituencies and/or agencies to look out for, and one would
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Ill

have to assume that all of their work
on the Special Commission had at least the inference of
self-serving awareness
of their constituencies even if an
actual self-serving
course of action did not exist.
,

Members of the legislature could be considered
to
have had special interests as well.
Some other members of the Commission, while not
rep-

resenting any particular constituency, certainly did not
give their complete dedication to the Commission's work.

Their attendance record in some cases was guite poor; in
one case

,

one Commission member did not attend even one

meeting
Throughout the proceedings of the Special Commission,
a casual observer would have found it almost impossible to

detect a true "focus" of the Commission that had any staying
power.

The direction of the Commission never assumed any

solid bent, but seemed to change as the months went by.
Part of the problem could be traced to the thrust of Chair-

man Boverini

,

who exhibited quite a carefree attitude at

first, then became more intent on coming up with something
to show for the Commission's efforts, and finally showed by

his example that politics within the legislature was the

most important factor in his Senate/Commission activities.
Also, part of the problem occurred because of the failure

of the Commission members to agree on a specific course of
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action.

The Commission had two separate subgroups
oper-

ating at the same time, and although this
situation allowed
for diversity

,

the situation also prohibited a unified

direction with a concurrent singular course of action.
^fter all the work of the Special Commission, one

chilling fact demanded to be recognized
remained boss.

— the

legislature

This fact proved to be irrefutable in spite

of the Commission's marathon session of May 16 and 17, 1980.

The attempt at a whirlwind finish for the Commission was

superseded by the action of the legislature in fashioning
its own reorganization package.

Despite the fact that fifteen of the Commission's

members were also members of the legislature, the imposing
force of the remaining 150 House members and 35 Senate mem-

bers enabled the legislature to do what it wanted to do

when it wanted to do it.

The thrust of the legislature in

recent years had been to issue criticisms of the Massachusetts public higher education system in relation to its

efficiency and to its effectiveness.

Furthermore, the

support of the public higher education system in Massachusetts by the legislature was far less than it should have
been.

With that background, it was relatively easy for

Representative John Finnegan, Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, to engineer a passage of a reorgani-

zation package through the House within the medium of the
House budget.

It was later just as easy for the House-
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Senate Conference Committee to agree on a massive change
for public higher education without granting public hearings, or without really consulting the members of the

public higher education constituency.
Other reasons proved to be important ones in
of why the Commission failed to reach its goals.

a

study

The mem-

bers of the various segments openly rejected directions

suggesting consolidation, and most segmental discussions of

reorganization centered on retention of current parochialism.

The competition among the public institutions of

higher education that had become a way of life over the
last several years did not cease during the life of the

Special Commission.

It seemed to intensify.

Each one of the

segments offered at least one plan for reorganization, and
each plan was unique.

A general feeling of doom pervaded

the meetings of the Special Commission, and overshadowed

the brief moments of elation that seemed to spring up on

occasion when it seemed the Commission had taken

a

giant

step forward.
One of the most devastating moments in the life of
the Commission took place on May

Edward J. King visited the group.

S,

1980 when Governor

His lack of positive

support for the Commission was a very unpleasant thing ior
me to witness, and must have been even more grueling to sit

through for the members of the Commission.

Some positive

support by the Governor would have served notice on the
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lsgi slatuirs that ths Commission would, be the vehicle by

which reorganization would come to pass.

The lack of such

support left the door wide open for the legislature to work
its will.

Hypothesis
One hypothesis that

I

feel deserves advancement is

that the very presence and activity of the Special Commission allowed the legislature to create its own reorganiza-

tion package.

The formation of the House reorganization

package, coming at a time when the Special Commission was

failing to make positive progress, allowed a concrete plan
of the legislature to take center stage.

Has the Commission not existed, any legislative

attempt to produce a reorganization package probably would
have been opposed.
The existence of the Commission allowed the plans

sponsored by the legislature to achieve credibility and
superior stature.

a

Instead of producing a plan of its own

in plenty of time to be pushed through the legislature, the

Commission procrastinated long enough to give the legislature
the opening that it needed.

Observations

After studying the Commission's eight months of work,
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the following observations appear to be valid reasons for
the failure of the Commission to succeed.
1.

support.

The Commission did not have strong popular
It is probable that the majority of the citizens

of the Commonwealth had no great interest in the workings
of the Commission, and thus offered no great swell of

support for the Commission's efforts.

Because of the lack

of clarity relative to the goals of the Commission, it

would have been difficult for the majority of citizens of
the Commonwealth to understand the full import of the

thrust of the Commission anyway.
2.

The Commission did not have strong legislative or

gubernatorial support.

It was evident from the Governor's

visit to the Commission on May

8,

1980 that the Governor

would rather lose the faith of the Commission than a good

working relationship with the legislature.

It was also

apparent that the legislature in general did not evince much
support for the work of the Commission.

Beginning with the

passage of the House budget bill containing

a

suggested

reorganization package, and continuing down to the votes of
the House and Senate on the suggestions of the Budget Con-

ference Committee, the legislature showed that it was boss.
(In his annual address to the legislature given on January

12,

1981, Governor Edward J. King highlighted the accom-

plishment of the reorganization of public higher education
as one of the major benchmarks of his administration.
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Robert

L.

Turner, writing in the Poston Globe

said that

,

the speech "included items for which King should take a

subordinate level of credit.

These include the higher ed-

ucation reorganization, which would have been impossible

without House Ways and Means Chairman John
3.

J.

Finnegan,.." 77

The Commission did not have strong support from

public higher education.

The goals of the segments of

public higher education were not coincidental with those of
the Commission.

Although some surface opposition from the

segments was apparent in relation to suggestions from the

Commission for future changes, the majority of opposition
was covert, and was generated in an attempt to keep a rela-

tively comfortable situation current.

Most site visits of

the Boston subgroup were greeted with reasons why the current

systems of segmental organization, and their components as
well, should not be changed.

Perhaps the leadership in

public higher education only reflected and/or reinforced the
kind of vacuum found in the Commission itself.
4.

The Commission did not have the quantity of

strength needed to overcome the massive liabilities cited in
items one, two and three.

Arnold Friedman had used the power

of the press to promulgate his feelings on who should carry

out the reorganization of higher education in Massachusetts,
but I'm afraid that the excellently written editorial failed
to stir the populace enough so that the citizens would take

umbrage with the methods employed by the legislature.

xhe
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Commission did not have the stature needed to take on
the
Governor

,

the legislature, the segments of public higher

education in relation to
popular support as well.

a

cause that failed to engender
The odds of the Commission's

success at meeting its aspirations became more and more poor
as the life of the Commission was extended.
5.

The leadership of the Commission was not dynamic.

The tempo of leadership shifted several times during the

life of the Commission.

Although the leadership of the two

subgroups showed sporadic life, the efforts of the two
leaders

(Senator D'Amico and Dr. Sherry) were not enough to

counteract the lack of dynamism overall.

Part of the reason

for difficulty in maintaining positive progress of the Com-

mission through its leadership stemmed from the dynamics of
the individual members of the Commission.

Even more important

than the dynamics exhibited individually was the timing of
same.

For instance. Representative Pokaski did not say or do

too much for most of the life of the Commission, but became
a potent force to deal with, and raised formidable obstacles

to swift completion of Boston subgroup action, during the

last days of the Commission.

Representative William Mullins

launched many fiery invectives during the course of the

Commission's deliberations at the ineptitude of the trustees
who ran the various institutions.

Each meeting found at

least one or two of the members dominating the proceedings
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with their own particular mode of action.
Another reason for the lack of forthright leadership
was the fact that quite a few meetings were spent in sifting

through material that should have been distributed to the

Commission in more succinct form.

When material has to be

literally waded through while a Commission is meeting in
regular session, one can see that forward progress will be
jeopardized.
6.

Finally, the culmination of the Commission's work

came too late, was too hastily conceived, had no direct

support of the legislature and was not put together in a

cohesive and attractive package.

Because there was very

little reason for the legislature to even consider adoption
of the Commission's offering, the inevitable happened

— the

Commission's attempt at creating a package of reorganization
failed.

The legislature prevailed.
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ton, D.C.:
7 Marilyn

,

,

^ Springfield

July

9,

1979, p.
^ Sunday

Daily News

,

(Springfield, Massachusetts)

15.

Republican

July 10, 1979, sec. B, p.

,

(Springfield, Massachusetts)
2.

^Article by Samuel Weiss, New York Times
1980, sec. B, p.

1.

120

,

January 16,

121

Lyman A. Glenny and Walter E. Neece
Study of Higher Education
(Lincoln:
1961.)

,

The Nebraska

.

^Robert 0. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Hiqher
education
(Washington, D.C.
American Council on Education,
1971.)
Taken from a report Lyman Glenny gave to Washington
Interim Committee on Education 1/22/1966.
^

,

:

13 Lyman

A. Glenny (et al
State Budgeting for HighEducation
Data Digest
(Berkeley:
Center for Research
and Development in Higher Education, 1975.)
.

:

14

)

,

ii

‘"•••a special commission to study and suggest reforms in the Commonwealth's basic educational structure was
appointed in 1962. The commission's staff was directed by
Benjamin C. Willis, former Superintendent of the Chicago
Public Schools, and was chaired by State Senator Kevin B.
Harrington.
The commission proposed a series of recommendations in 1965 which were recently adopted and are significantly transforming education in the state." Taken from
Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar, and Emanuel Hurwitz Jr.,
Education and State Politics Teachers College Press,
(Teachers College, Columbia University, 2nd Printing, 1971.)
,

,

^Chapter 9 of the Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (S 1790) provided for an investigation and study by a Special Commission relative to the
evaluation and reorganization of public higher education in
the Commonwealth, and allowed for 5 Senate members, 5 House
of Representative members, and 10 gubernatorial appointments.

1

7

Senate
Walter Boverini
John Olver
Mary Fonseca
Gerard D'Amico

House
Matrango
Collins
King
Corazzini

Pokaski
Mullins
Murray
Holland

The final roster of the Executive Committee of the
previous (1977) Special Commission is as follows:
-*-

8

Baker, (Judith)
Boverini, (Sen. Walter)
Collins, (Rep. James G.)
Eliot, (Dr. Thomas)
King, (Rep. Melvin H.)
Olver, (Sen. John)
Sherry, (Dr. Francis)
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The document used in providing this
list
Search Process for Executive Director" and was was entitled
a oart of the
S
hS 1977 P Cial Coranissio ” in storage
within the
o???ce of
o? th
c
office
the present? Special
Commission.

The document also lists the four finalists,
including
D
,
, Hailer, current
Richard
executive director.
.

Interestingly, another current member of the
sion staff, Janet Slovin, was a semifinalist for the Commiscost of
executive director.
19

Boston Globe
Section, p. 18.

,

.

20

sec. A, p.

Thursday, June 21, 1979, .Metro/Region

Boston Herald American

,

Friday, September 21, 1979,

6.

21

This information was found in the Morning Union,
(Springfield, Massachusetts), p. 16, June 25, 1979. A complete report of reorganization suggestions in Connecticut
is on file in the office of the Special Commission on Reorganization, Room 15, State House, Boston, Massachusetts.
22 John B.

Barnes and Gerald R. Reed (eds.), The
Emerging State College
(Boise, Idaho:
Boise State College
Press, 1968.)
,

23

Senate Bill No. 1371 by Mr. Harrington, a petition
of Kevin B. Harrington for legislation to reorganize the
administration, coordination and planning of postsecondarv
educational affairs (1976)
,

2^

House Bill 5756 an act to improve statewide oversight, coordination and planning for higher education, (1977)
Michael S. Dukakis, Governor.
,

2

^"Public Higher Education Planning", (working paper),
August 17, 1977, Executive Office of Educational Affairs,
Paul Parks, Secretary.
26

Paper of Kermit C. Morrissey, President, Boston
April 27, 1979, entitled "Massachusetts
State College.
Public Higher Education - Time to Reorganize".
2

^Paper of Massachusetts Board of Higher Education,
August 31, 1979, prepared by Board of Higher Education staff
members Seon Cho Paul Rahmeier, Janice Green and Edward
Wright, Jr.
,
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et( r

college

Abbs nd Graham Carey, Proposal for a New
^
Heinemann Educational Books 1977

;
f
(London:

,

,

.

29 Ibid.
30 David

M. Bartley, Former Speaker, Massachusetts
House of Representatives.

31 David Schuman,
Bureaucracies, Organizations, a nd
Administration: A Political Primer^ (New York: Macmillan

Publishing Co., Inc., 1976.)

A Preface to Politics 2nd Edition,
ton, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1977.)
•

,

(Lexing-

32

Public Financing of Higher Education
Tax Foundation, Inc., 1966.)
33 Ernest

(New York:

,

G. Palola, (et al
Higher Education by
Design:
The Sociology of Planning
(Berkeley:
Center for
Research and Development in Higher Education, 1970.)
.

)

,

,

34

Amitai Etziom, Readings on Modern Organizations,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.)
.

3

^Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of
Higher Education
(Washington, D.C.
American Council on
Education, 1971.)
:

,

36

Ibid.

37

Article in Boston Globe headlined "Campus Consolidation Considered Inevitable by Some", January 7, 1980,
Metro/Region Section, p. 13.
33 John Finnegan,

Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, Thomas McGee, Speaker of the House, William
Bulger, President of the Senate, Chester Atkins, Chairman
of the Senate Ways and Means Committee.
39 Boston Globe

^ Boston
p.

6

,

January 15, 1980, p. 18.

Herald American

,

February

1,

1980, sec. A,

.

41 Robert 0.

Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher
Education, (Washington, D.C. American Council on Education,
This was taken from Smith, G. Kerry (ed.), Coop1971.
erative Planning to Meet the Need of Increased Enrollments,
Current Issues in Higher Education, Association for Higher
Education, National Education Association, 1956, p. 321.
:

)
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42

Remarks at some point" made by Richard Hailer,
Executive Director.
43
44

P^^sritheses and contents within put in bv author.

Parentheses and contents within put in by author.

45

Present were:
Chancellor Corrigan, UMass/Boston
President Haskins, Roxbury Community College
President McKenzie, Massachusetts Bay Community
College
President Morrissey, Boston State College
President Nolan, Massachusetts College of Art
President Shively, Bunker Hill Community College

4 6

Parentheses and contents within put in by author.

4

"Reference of Senator D'Amico was made about the
former President of Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Dr.
George Hazzard.
48

Robert Stuart serves as Executive Director of the
State College Building Authority.
49

—

"Dover Project"
focus of a journalistic series
commencing in the Sunday Republican
(Springfield, Massachusetts)
of December 23, 1979 and continuing in the Morning
(Springfield, Massachusetts), December 24, 25 and 26,
Union
The articles were written by Jonathan Tilove, and
1979.
dealt with the innovative task taken by the state college
system in attempting to marry itself to high technology.
,

,

,

-^Dr. Russ Davis, Consultant to many world governments, professor at Harvard.
5

It is my personal opinion that the Boston subgroup
abdicated its responsibility when it allowed the institutions to establish the format of its visits, rather than
doing it itself.
52

April 27, 1979, report of Kermit Morrissey entitled
"Massachusetts Public Higher Education Time to Reorganize."

—

53 Dr.

John R. Rothermel, Program Development and
Research, Boston State College.
54 It was stated that the median number of students
participating in a cooperative program nationwide was 80;

Boston State College had well over that, and expected to
have between three and four hundred students in the program
by 1984.

125
55

Dr. Carl Cedargren, Professor of Languages, Boston
State College.
56

Cost per student comparison:
Boston State
UMass/Boston
$1,768.00
$3,200.00

57

Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
Process, 2nd edition, (Boston
Little, Brown and Company,
:

1974

.)

"“Governor Foster Furcolo was appointed to the Board
of Regents on August 1, 1980, by Governor Edward J. King.
As of September 30, 1980, he exhibited perfect attendance at
meetings of the Regents.
CQ
J

-'May

8

,

1980 meeting of full Commission.

60 Only fifty-nine
days remained until June 11,

September

1,

1980.
1980 was yet another eighty-one days away.

61 Correct
fi

spelling is baccalaureate.

2

Recommendations of University of Massachusetts
President to University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees,
Committee on Long-Range Planning.
(Document T 80-023 of
April 1, 1980).

^ The

Massachusetts Teacher published by MassachuApril, 1980), p. 14.
setts Teachers Association (Boston

...
,

:

,

64

House 62 00 will be described

m

Appenc.ix H.

^Reverend Michael V7alsh, former President of Boston
College, and Dr. Francis Keppel former United States
Commissioner of Education.
,

^Editorial in Sunday Republican (Sprinaf ield
Massachusetts), April 20, 1980, sec. B, p. 2.
,

^ Boston

Globe

,

May

5

,

1980, p. 20.

68 The motion of Representative Collins called for a

nominating committee to make appointments
to the board, two segmental boards (University and State
College, and Community College), and strong powers.

21-member board,

a

6'it is important to note here that the Senate budget
contained no outside language concernina reorganization.
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T^e
Commission on the
of
Higher Education will conduct its study Reorganization
as quickly as
possible commensurate with providing a quality
report.
The Special Commission believes its renort
will be
heard by the Joint Committee on Education with
public
hearings. .the normal legislative process.
The Special Commission respectfully requests
that
Executive and Legislative leadership support efforts for the
a
quality reorganization of public higher education."
.

,

.

Motion taken directly from minutes of dav session
of Special Commission meeting of May 16, 1980 (actual
wording of motion initially and officially passed was quite
a
bit different, but the sense remained the same.)
7°
^

Sunday Republican
May 18, 1980, p. 1.
73
7

1980, p.

Boston Globe

June

,

Morning Union

,

,

(Springfield, Massachusetts)

6,

1980, p.

21.

(Springfield, Massachusetts), June

1.

75 Boston Globe

,

June 10, 1980, p.

1.

^ Boston

Globe

,

June 11, 1980

14.

77 3oston

Globe

,

Tuesday, January 13, 1981, p.

,

p.

1.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Reprinted from the Springfield (Ma.) Daily News
August 13, 1979
A. A.

,

Michelson

"Laws Hidden Inside Budget"

The general impression is that when the Legislature

adopts a budget for the coming year it is simply approving
a $5.5 billion appropriation to meet the needs of state and

local governments.

But there's much more to it.

priation is only Section

2

The multi-billion appro-

of a 118-page document that in-

cludes 73 sections.
The last 71 sections are in prose, not in arith-

metical figures.

It is called the "outside section" of the

budget and over the years it has been the source of much

mischief
Many state administrators today, for instance, who

enjoy life tenure without ever having to subject themselves
to a Civil Service test, are the beneficiaries of the out-

side section.

Many Jobs Added
Jobs used to be added in the outside section to
jobs
agencies in wholesale lots, the recipients of the

135

136

having been previously selected by legislators and the

appointing authorities.
Today the outside section is less oriented to person-

alities than to policy.

But even so it often reflects the

feelings and prejudices of legislative leaders.
It is also used to catch up on some questionable

practices the Ways and Means Committee had run into in its
review of proposed appropriations submitted by executive
agencies
Section 49, for instance, inveighs against the munificence of public higher education boards.
Late last year, for instance, presidents of state

colleges were granted pay raises of $5,000 or more.

The

increases represented substantially more than the raises
given other high-paid administrators of state government

whose increases were geared to the percentage increase

accorded all state workers following formal collective
bargaining negotiations.
Sets Pay Ceiling
So Section 49 says any state employe

(sic)

whose

be paid any more
salary is $30,000 a year or more may not
plus whatever has been
than they were getting July 1, 1977,
bargaining.
allowed since than as a result of collective
regular expense
Section 41 allows legislators their
in session so long as
allowance when the Legislature is not

137

they are on "legislative business."

Section 40 appropriates $50,000 for the Special Com-

mission on Performing Arts.
2

This is over and above Section

appropriations of $2.3 million for the State Council on

Arts and Humanities.
The Special Commission, it should be noted, is a pet

project of Representative John J. Finnegan, D-Boston, chair-

man of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate President

William M. Bulger, D-Boston.
Section 39 is aimed largely at mental health administrators.

It decrees that no state official can enter into

consent decrees without have (sic) the necessary funds to
back up the costs of such a decree.

Closed State Hospitals
Last year mental health administrators signed consent

decrees, virtually closing up state mental hospitals.

There

is a financial problem now as to how the released patients

from those hospitals are going to be cared for in community

facilities
Section 29 orders the Department of Public Welfare to
get a second medical opinion in all elective surgical cases
for welfare recipients.

This obviously reflects the feeling

that too much questionable surgery has been performed.
A similar section was inserted directing the Depart-

ment of Public Welfare to require that drug prescriptions
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for welfare patients be filled by the generic name of the

"wherever possible."

drug,

Drugs by their generic name cost

one-third or more less than drugs by their brand names.
But the section that is farthest out in the outside

section is the one which calls for the state government of

Massachusetts to boycott croods manufactured by J.P. Stevens
and Company, Inc., the giant textile firm which has thumbed
its corporate nose at the National Labor Relations Board and

the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union for the

past five years.
No Stevens Purchases
"No funds appropriated in this act," Section 54, de-

"shall be used by state institution, agency, commis-

clares,

sion or department for the purchase of goods manufactured
by J.P. Stevens, Inc."
It is the handiwork of Sen. Chester D. Atkins, D-Con-

cord

,

chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee.

He

state
was responding obviously to labor leaders and to the

s

liberal constituency.
It's an extremely unusual tack.

It could be tnat a

the Atkins
majority in Massachusetts would be in favor of

boycott.

It could be that it has great merit.

with unfair
Stevens is an outfit that has been charged

police surveillance,
labor practices, encouraging illegal
and organizers.
and violating civil rights of workers
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Prompts Film Story
The company's labor practices has prompted Hollywood
to produce

(sic)

film, Norma Rae" which depicts the trials

and tribulations of a Southern woman trying to rally her co-

workers against the company, and it has already grossed $10
million.

Nevertheless
too.

,

Section 54 has its disquieting aspects

For all its philosophical merits, it is

(sic)

bad kind

of precedent.

The new

lav/

was never given a hearing.

debated on the floor of the House or Senate.

It was never

It's a very

serious controversial matter enacted in the dark.
unpopular
And if a boycott of a company that may be
one man's prejudices
in Massachusetts can become law through

future against a
today, it can also be directed in the
doesn’t have Chet Atkins
company by a legislative leader that
(sic)

social consciousness.

APPENDIX

B

MEMBERS OF SPECIAL COMMISSION

Commission M embers
Name

(Gubernatorial Appointments)

Appointed

James M. Howell
Wayne Budd
Robert Spiller
Arnold Friedman
George Hazzard
Dorothy Singer
Erancis Sherry
James Hammond
John Collins
Foster Furcolo
Janet Robinson
John Fox

10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
10/12/79
1/29/80
5/9/80

Commission Members

Withdrew
12/79

4/80

(Senate)

Walter J. Boverini
Robert C. Buell
Gerard D'Amico
Mary L. Fonseca
John W. Olver
Commission Members

(House

Salvatore P. Cimino
James G. Collins
Leo R. Corazzini
Iris K. Holland
Melvin H. King
Frank J. Matrango
Joan M. Menard
William D. Mullins
Mary J Murray
Daniel F. Pokaski
.

Commission Members

Gregory Anrig
Laura Clausen
Charles Johnson
Michael Daly

(ex officio)

Commissioner of Education
Chancellor, Board of Higher Education
Secretary of Education
Deputy Commissioner of Education
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APPENDIX C

TRUSTEE POSITION PAPER ON REORGANIZATION

Reorganization of Public Higher Education
(Voted by the Board at its August 29, 1979 meeting.)

The Board of Trustees believes it is of utmost impor-

tance to the Commonwealth to maintain its statewide University, encompassing interrelated campuses at Amherst, Boston

and Worcester and field, experiment, research and public

service facilities throughout Massachusetts.

The statewide

University should continue to provide an integrated program
of teaching, research and public service of the highest

quality to the people of the Commonwealth.

No plan of re-

organization should be adopted which severs and isolates
the Boston urban campus and its natural student constitu-

encies from the benefits of the quality and prestigious

programs offered by our statewide University.
Any reorganization of higher education in Massa-

chusetts should clearly reflect the unique mission and

responsibility of the statewide University, and should be
based on a careful examination of the needs of the Common-

wealth

.

The relationship of any other existing institutions
or segments to the statewide University should be carefully

evaluated on the basis of their compatibility with those
8/29/79

needs
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Principles for Statewide Organization
of Public- Hiaher
Education
i'
„

Doc.T 79-085

The organisation of public higher education in Massa-

chusetts must reflect the needs of the Commonwealth.

The

following principles should guide any reorganization:
1

Massachusetts must have

.

a

sy s tem o f public higher

education of high quality, offering

a range of

programs

1

diverse enough to meet the educational needs of its
citizens

.

Massachusetts must recognize public higher education

primarily as an investment which will yield economic
and social benefits.

It must insist on quality at all

levels of public higher education; the public should
not be asked to support programs of poor quality.
2

.

Within the whole education system, the mission,

__

role, a nd function of each seg men t or category of

institut i ons must be more clearly different iated

Clearer understanding of each segment

s

role in a

system will reduce wasteful redundancy of programs
in
and will clarify the choice the student makes

seeking admission to a program.

Admission criteria

missions
and practices should reflect the differing
and programs of the segments.
3

Univers i t y
Massachu ^-i-*-^ need s a statewide public_

with primary responsibility for JJJperal

professional and professional

_e ducatlon_at_the

under -
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graduate and graduate levels

,

and for research,

technical assistance and public service throughout
the Commonwealth

.

Such an institution should be characterized in all its

parts by quality faculty, as signified by

high per-

a

centage of terminal degrees and by active engagement
in research and professional activity as well as in

instruction.

It should be able to meet all criteria

appropriate for national recognition by accreditinq
bodies, including having a core of full-time faculty
in all programs.

In addition to a residential campus and to the

historic functions of the land-grant institution, it
should have one or more urban campuses which provide
access to commuting students and serve as

a

focal

point for the delivery of public service and technical assistance to the public and private institu-

tions and agencies concentrated in metropolitan areas.

Programs on all campuses should meet the criteria of quality faculty and eligibility for national

recognition, and should extend across the range Oi

activities appropriate for a University.
4

.

Massachuset ts needs

a

network of community

colleges with primary responsibility for two-year
proarams

,

p roviding

ready access for local popula-

tions and responsive to local needs.
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iiie

community colleges provide two-year career-

oriented technical programs

,

as well as programs pro-

viding entry points into higher education, with
adequate opportunities for transfer into senior
institutions
5

In evaluating the continuing need for a third

.

category of institutions, Massachusetts should consider defining more specifically the mission of its
state colleges giving special attention to their

offering of four-year career-oriented programs.
Such programs should be closely related to the

areas of specialization of the community colleges in

nearby areas, providing appropriate and logical extension of those programs in fields where career-

oriented training beyond the Associate degree level
is warranted.

Close organizational coordination be-

tween community and state colleges is required for

both regular degree and continuing education programs.
The range of programs offered by state colleges

should avoid redundancy, at least on a regional basis.
6

.

In reviewing the mission of its state colleges

and their relationship to the community colleges

,

Massachusetts should carefully consider whether its
educational needs require continued maintenance of the
10 state and 15 community colleges.

Such a review might indicate the feasibility of
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reducing the number of institutions by merger or

consolidation
7

The review of institutions should be carried out

.

region by region

,

and modifications of the present

configuration should vary from one regional situation
to another

.

In each case it is important to take into account

the existence of other institutions in close geo-

graphic proximity.
8

.

In recognizing the clearer differentiation of

missions among the segments of higher education,

Massachusetts must develop a governance structure

which provides effective coordination, yet allows
each segment and institution flexibility to respond
to local needs and build on local strengths.

The structure should be sufficiently consolidated

and inclusive to allow coordination and implementation
of plans, but should maintain the functional differen-

tiation of the segments and permit substantial dele-

gation of authority to the local level.

The structure

should reflect major differences of mission and scope
in varying types of institutions.
9

Massachusetts must maintain and strengthen

a state

shoul d
wide coordinating mechanism, but this agency

insti^
not be responsible for the governance of any

tution or segment.
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The coordinating agency is not an advocate for

any institution, segment, or sector.

It should be

responsible for providing the Governor and the General
Court with reliable data and analyses for all institutions; should review all requests from public insti-

tutions for operating and capital outlay appropriations;
should develop and update a statewide master plan defining scope and missions of all institutions; should

review existing programs and new proposals for consistency with this plan; and should exercise the Collegiate Authority.
10

Both the governance and the coordination of high-

.

er education should be the responsibility of lay

boards of high quality

.

Boards should have full authority to appoint the

chief executives and officers of their segment, institution, or agency.

Governing boards should have the fullest possible

authority for management of resources appropriated for
their segments and institutions, including the ability
to shift resources among institutions.

They should

have full authority to establish tuition levels appro-

priate to their institutions.
11

.

in addition to the formal coordinating bodies,

Massachusetts should provide ways for enhancing coqp^
eration on

a

regional basis, including the private as
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well as the public sector

.

Consortia such as Five Colleges Inc. and the

Worcester Consortium for Higher Education should be
encouraged, and the potential usefulness of regional

planning councils should be explored.
12

.

Massachusetts must strive to provide adequate

access to higher education by offering a diversity of

academic programs, by maintaining reasonable tuition
levels supplemented by state tuition aid, and by

eliminating both tangible and intangible barriers to
equal access opportunity, for all qualified persons.
An adequate system of student financial assis-

tance must be developed which takes into account

opportunities for Massachusetts students in the
private as well as the public sector.
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A Possible Framework for the Reorganization
Doc.T 79-086
Public Higher Educatio n in the Boston Area
A.

INTRODUCTION

Realignment of public higher education in the Boston
area should be consistent with, and part of, a statewide

reorganization.

And it should be designed to meet the real

educational requirements of the Commonwealth.

Massachusetts clearly needs:

—

A strong community college network offering two-

year programs which provide both career-oriented technical training and opportunities for transfer into

four-year institutions.

These programs should be

closely responsive to community needs, and their costs
and admissions standards should be designed to insure

maximum access;

—

A statewide University, combining residential and

urban commuter campuses, emphasizing four-year under-

graduate and graduate programs in professional fields
and the liberal arts, and providing the research,

technical assistance, and public service programs

which are the historical responsibilities of state
universities.

Admissions criteria and costs should

be consistent with the nature of its program.

Less clearly definable is the overall relationship of
the state colleges to the general pattern of higher education.

Many of them provide important opportunities for access to
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education

,

but the total scope, mission, and number

of colleges needs careful examination.

The review should be carried out case-by-case, taking
into consideration the offerings and strengths of other

institutions in the geographical area of each college.

Modifications in the present system of state colleges
should vary, we believe, from one region to another.
B

.

The Boston Area

Nowhere is the need for reviewing the continuing and
unmet educational needs more pressing than in the Boston

metropolitan area.

As the state's major urban area, Boston

needs the full range of educational programs, from two-year

career-oriented technical training to advanced professional
education
Because its population includes large numbers both of

educationally disadvantaged students and adults seeking
part-time and in-service education, Boston especially needs

diversity in the cost, time and mode of delivery, and
location of its programs.
And the metropolitan area is likely to have increasing

need for the technical assistance and public service capa-

bilities of a University.
Because we can expect diminishing, or at best stable,
financial support for the educational needs of the Boston
programs and
we need a clear assessment of the essential
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institutions which can result in reconfigurations that

eleminate wasteful duplication and cut back programs of
lesser priority.

Presently

,

there is clearly considerable overlap

among existing institutions and programs.

now supports two institutions in Boston
Boston State College

— which

offer

a

The Commonwealth

— UMass/Boston

and

wide range of bacca-

laureate programs, although the total number of uoper

division (junior and senior level) students in the two
institutions combined is only about 4,500 full-time equivalent

(

FTE

)

.

These programs and students could be much more

effectively accommodated in a single institution.
Furthermore, Boston State and UMass/Boston now provide
a first point of entry for

many students who are seeking

higher education but who have not yet developed well-defined
interests and goals.

A large proportion of these students

would probably be better served initially by

a

strengthened

community college.
In view of this, we suggest a new configuration of

institutions as follows:
1)

The University of Massachusetts Center at Boston

,

combining the current University of Massachusetts
at Boston and the Massachusetts College of Art

(maintained as a distinct unit)

resoonsibility for

:

,

and assuming

all four year undergraduate

programs in the liberal arts and in pre-profes-
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sional and professional areas deemed needed in the

Boston area; all graduate programs; continuing

education programs at an upper division undergraduate and graduate level; and lower division
programs in those areas not available at the

community colleges.
2)

An expanded Community College network, primarily

responsible for two year career oriented, technical
programs, but offering, as well, transfer programs
as needed.

The Community Colleges would also pro-

vide continuing education at a lower division
level as appropriate.

The principle

(sic)

objectives of this configuration would be

to provide educational services better suited to

the needs of the Boston area and at less cost;
to expand and strengthen the community colleges
as the institutions most suitable to provide low

cost access to the majority of entering students;
to create a single institution which will accom-

modate the limited number of upper division and
graduate students now in the system, doing so at
the highest available level of quality;
to bring the Massachusetts College of Art into the

University of Massachusetts, thereby enhancing the

capacity of both to provide advanced and graduate
education while preserving the distinct identity
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and character of the College of Art;
to continue the development of the University of

Massachusetts at Boston as

a

comprehensive univer-

sity center capable of providing undergraduate and

graduate education of the highest quality as well
as the public service, research, and technical

assistance functions to the statewide University
system;
to make possible a more effective and coordinated

approach to the educational needs of adult and
other non-traditional students;
to provide clearer differentiation of mission, and

therefore clearer choices for the benefit of

potential students;
to create a simpler institutional structure more

adaptable to future changes in enrollment; and
to accomplish these objectives at less cost than

continuing the current expenditures for existing
institutions
This framework can form the basis of further discussion of feasability (sic) and exploration of alternative

approaches with all concerned.

APPENDIX D

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS
NOTE:

All listed are plans forwarded to the Special

Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education
and do not reflect official recommendations/actions
of the Special Commission.
15

,

All are on file in Room

State House, Boston, MA.

1973

H. 6160

(Sargent/Cronin)

Board of Post-Secondary
Education Five Regional
Boards

1976

H. 4623

(Dukakis)

Board of Overseers-charged
with developing one of three
alternative structures.

1976

H. 4482

(Matrango/BHE

Restructured BIIE - 11
gubernatorial appointees.

1976

S

(Harrington)

Board of Trustees of the
Colleges and Universities
of Massachusetts.
Councils
with limited authority at
campus level.

1977

H.5756

(Dukakis)

Board of Overseers Segmental Boards intact.

1977

Working draft
(Dukakis/Parks)

1977

H.619

1978

Sloan Commission

Massachusetts Higher Ed.
Commission Segments intact.

1979

McGuire

Restructured BHE; strengthened - 6 Segments (City U.
of Boston)

.

1371

Strengthened Coordinating
Agency - Regional Boards.
Restructured BHE; increased
powers

(Gannett)
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UMass. Board

1979

Coordinating Board Restructured Boston
Institutions -Expanded
Community Colleges.

1979

Kermit Morrissey

Single Board of Regents

1980

Community Colleges

Coordinating Board Restructure Community
College Board.

1980

MBRCC (Boston)

Two-Tiered governance
system

1980

Foster Furcolo

Post-Secondary Education
Commission Three Segmental
Boards - Advisory Boards
at each college.

1980

SMU

Coordinating Board,
strengthened - Segments
retain autonomy.

1980

H. 6262

1980

Secretary of Ed.

1980

BHE

Note

:

(Finnegan)

Board of Public Regents
supplants Secretary of Ed;
BHE; State College Board
and Community College Board
Universities retain autonomy
All administrative staffs
reduced.

Expanded Exec. Ofc. of Ed.
(with a planning council of
15 members and a program
council of 11 members) replaces BHE.

Expanded BHE (with planning
budget and program authority)
replaces Exec. Ofc. of
Education

duplicated
apitalization and punctuation have been
from the
obtained
<actly from the original paper
Decial Commission.

APPENDIX E

GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE GOALS

DETERMINE

;

-Role and function of Secretary's Office

-Role and function of a Central Board

-Powers a Central Board should exercise

-Structure of the systems:

Community College,

state college, university

-Function of segmental or institutional boards

-Constitution of boards

WORK PLAN FOR COMMITTEE

:

-Review major reorganization plans
-Analyze plans as they address major functions:
budget, planning, programs, etc.

-Evaluate effectiveness of present system as it
addresses major functions. Identify problem
areas
-Invite authors of reorganization plans to meet
with subcommittee
-Meet with constituency groups, perhaps on
different campuses throughout the state

-Review systems of other states
Commission
-Submit report and recommendations to full
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APPENDIX F

GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

PREAMBLE
In order to foster the development of well-planned,

administered and coordinated institutions and policies of
public higher education, to improve the quality and extend
the benefits of education, to promote diversity of educa-

tional opportunity, and to encourage an economical and effective use of the public and private resources of the Common-

wealth, the structure of public higher education within the

Commonwealth is hereby redefined in accordance with the
provisions of this act.
Board of Governors

Membership:

21 members

-20 Gubernatorial appointees and the Governor or his/

her Secretary of Education
-a Nominating Commission shall recommend to the

Governor appointees to the Board
-Chairman elected by B.O.G.
-Members serve at large

-Staggered 5-year terms:

limit

2

terms

-No member to receive remuneration from public/private

higher education

-Transition membership (staggered appointments
dual service)
U Mass -

2

161

-

no

162

State Colleges

-

2

Community Colleges
SMU

-

2

1

U Lowell -

BHE -

-

1

3

-Chief Executive appointed by B.O.G.

(?

vote)

-B.O.G. has authority to transfer funds among its own

agency accounts
Powers of Board of Governors

Mission

-approve/disapprove missions

Budget-Recommendations and Presentation:
-approve and authorize segmental maintenance and
capital outlay requests on FY 2-year cycle in accordance with format set by B.O.G.

-present one consolidated budget by segment and

institutions to Governor and House and Senate Ways
and Means

Transferability of Funds
-authority to transfer funds among its own agency
accounts
-budgets appropriated by segments and institutions.
instituB.O.G. has authority to transfer funds among
set by
tions and segments in accordance with format

House and
B.O.G. upon notification and approval of
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Senate Ways and Means and Administration and Finance

-segments have the authority to transfer funds among
the institutions within their purview in accordance

with format set by B.O.G. and with B.O.G. approval
-institutions have authority to transfer funds among
accounts in accordance with format set by B.O.G. with
(segmental approval?

advisory board approval?) and

with notification to segment and B.O.G.
Collective Bargaining:
An Office of Employee Service will be established

within the Board of Governors to
-coordinate collective bargaining efforts of
segments

-provide expertise and resources to the segments
-relate to the Office of Employee Relations in

matters of wage guidelines

Tuition Policy:
-authority to establish tuitions for public higher

education institutions
Capital Outlay:

—review capital outlay requests from segments
— recommend to

expenditures.

legislature and governor canitax outlav
-Jo

capital outlay appropriation shall

be made v;ithout B.O.G. approval.

-B.O.G. may initiate capital requests
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-(Await additional information

from.

Ward Commission's

recommendations on construction throughout the state)

Program
-establish, review, approve and amend by majority vote

programs and degrees for public higher education

-discontinue programs and degrees for public higher

education by a 2/3 vote
-continue to exercise authority presently vested in

Board of Higher Education for private institutions

-(Definition of program shall be as presently defined
by Board of Higher Education)

Planning

-establish 5-year master plan (including capital
outlay planning) to present annually to legislature
and governor.

-present to legislature and governor 2-year progress
reports

Information

-authority to collect and analyze data for purposes of

establishing a management information system

Scholarship
—Commission requests staff to research best possible
approach to tie together all financial aid programs,
including HELP, and to determine the efficacy of an

autonomous agency

165

Affirmative Action:
-authority to establish affirmative action policy and
take such actions as may be necessary to assure con-

formance with that policy

Collaboration
-promote public/private collaboration and coordination
-promote intersegmental coordination and resolve conflicts over policy or operation

Segmental Boards
Segmental Boards would have the following responsibilities:

(The number and make-up of boards would be deter-

mined at a later date.)
-establish mission statement for approval by B.O.G.
-establish and submit to B.O.G. for authorization

maintenance and capital outlay budgets
-have the authority to transfer funds among the

institutions within their purview in accordance with
format set by B.O.G. and with B.O.G. approval

-conduct collective bargaining:

serve as employer

-submit 5-year plan in accordance with mission state-

ment for approval by B.O.G.
-submit 2-year progress report to B.O.G.

-determine academic policies

-establish personnel policies with authority to appoint,
transfer, dismiss, promote and award tenure
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-be the employer for the chief executive officer of

segments and of chancellors of each institution
-set admissions policy in order to accomplish missions

assigned to segments by B.O.G.
-set fees

-establish policies concerning physical plants

-establish affirmative action policies
Trustees of segmental boards will be nominated through
the process established by a Nominating Commission.

Advisory Boards
Advisory Boards will be established at each institution with the following responsibilities:

-review institutional budget recommendations
committee
-be represented by its chairman on the search
for the chancellor of its institution
and
-serve to encourage linkage between community

institution

Secretary of Education
shall rest with lay
The governance of higher education
Commission. Any statutory
boards, as proposed by the Special
which conflict with
provisions for the Secretary of Education

this principle should be deleted.

Education should be deterThe role of the Secretary of
he is an adviser, provided
mined by the Governor, to whom
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that such role shall not be in conflict with the statutory

authority of the lay boards.
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APPENDIX H

MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE BILL 6200
is important to address the issue of what was
con-

tained in House 6200 and the ramifications of its final

passage in the House.
House 6200, dated April

9,

1980, contained multiple

sections dealing with a reorganization plan for higher education.

This language was part of the budget, but was

"outside of" the line items of the budget, hence the term

outside language.
The reorganization language called for a combining of
the state and community colleges, and the formation of a

15-member board of public regents to govern those 25 institutions.

The University of Massachusetts, Lowell and

Southeastern Massachusetts would be governed by individual
boards of trustees.
Concurrently, the language of 6200, pending approval,

would abolish the Board of Higher Education, the Secretary
of Educational Affairs, and the state and community college

trustees
None of this language appeared in the Governor's

budget message. House
In fact. House

I

I.

called for the amount of $305,524.00

in the line item 7000-0100 labeled Executive Office of
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6200 only allowed $76,202.00 for the same line item.

Also, the line items 7101-0001 labeled Administration

Division of State Colleges received $1,054,140.00 in the

Governor's budget message of House

I,

but only a recommend-

ation of $262,935.00 in the budget message of the House
6200.

Making it even more confusing is that during the pro-

ceedings of the House when House 6200 was being considered
for passage, it is alleged that the Governor and members of

his staff lobbied actively for passage of the outside lan-

guage of House 6200, even though parts of it were diametrically opposed to House

I.

During the debate prior to the eventual passage of

House 6200, an attempt was made to repeal Sections 56-69
by Representative James Collins.

The attempt failed, 83-67, partly because of the

massive dedication to passage of the Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, partly because of the opposition
to Representative Collins's move by the leadership of the

House of Representatives, and partly because of the less
than unanimous support of the House legislative members of
the Special Commission.

Representative Leo Corazzini,

a

House member of the Special Commission, voted against the

prooosal to remove the outside language pertaining to public

higher education from House 6200.

173

The fight was certainly bitter on the House floor
when
the amendment was being debated.

One of the suprising

opponents of the amendment was Barney Frank, supposedly an
avowed friend of education.

me

subject of the House Bill 6200 would come up again

among educators and others for the next couple of months.
The Commission had worked for several months with the

threat of a legislative reorganization package always just
about to happen.

Now it had happened

.

However, the relief of it happening at last was over-

shadowed by the new fear that now that the House version of

reorganization had passed, the Senate version (or Conference
Committee version) could be worse.
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